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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Plaintiff-Appellee does not dispute this Court's jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the district court correctly concluded that defendants waived their

contractual right to arbitration by actively participating in litigation for over two years, to
a point inconsistent with intent to arbitrate, resulting in prejudice to plaintiff if arbitration
is compelled.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was raised in defendants' Motion to Compel
Arbitration, which was denied by the district court. (R. 677, 777; Add. 1.)
Standard of Review: Correctness. Central Florida Inv., Inc. v. Parkwest Assoc,
2002 UT 3,^10, 40 P.3d 599.
2.

Whether defendants are equitably estopped from asserting a contractual

right to arbitrate after actively participating in this litigation for over two years, and
compelling arbitration would injure plaintiff.
Preservation of Issue: This issue was preserved by plaintiffs counsel at the
hearing on defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 1162, Tr. 88-89.) While
estoppel was not relied upon by the district court, this Court may affirm the district court
ruling "on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record." Dipoma v. McPhie, 2001
UT 61,^18, 29 P.3d 1225.
Standard of Review: "The application of the facts to the legal standard of
equitable estoppel is a mixed question of fact and law." Trolley Square Assocs. v.
Nielsen, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah App. 1994). However, courts give "considerable

deference to [the district court's] findings and judgment" on questions of equity. Angelos
v. First Interstate Bank, 671 P.2d 772, 776 (Utah 1983).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-131 (2002) states that "an arbitration agreement made
before May 6, 2002 shall be governed by the arbitration act in force on the date the
agreement was signed." (Add. 57.) The agreement at issue in this case was signed
February 6, 1998. (R. 14.) Therefore, the agreement is governed by Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-3 la-3 (2002), the statute in effect on February 6, 1998. That section states: "A
written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to arbitration is valid,
enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or equity to set aside
the agreement or when fraud is alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure." (Emp. add.) (Add. 55.)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action concerns a dispute over a distributor agreement (the "Agreement")
whereby Defendants-Appellants Britesmile Management, Inc. ("Defendants") appointed
Plaintiff-Appellee Smile Inc. Asia ("Plaintiff) as their exclusive agent for the sales, use
and distribution of their equipment, reagents, and laser-aided teeth-whitening products in
Southeast Asia. (R. 3.) The Agreement contained an arbitration clause requiring the
parties to submit any dispute involving the Agreement to arbitration. (Agreement,
\ 14(d), R. 20.) This appeal concerns the enforceability of the arbitration clause.
Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants on April 23, 2002, alleging breach
of contract and fraud claims stemming from Defendants' failure to honor the Agreement.
2

(R. 1.) The parties proceeded to litigate the dispute for over two years. Among other
things, Defendants filed two dispositive motions (R. 39, 124), engaged in extensive
discovery (R. 76, 74, 80, 367, 690-91, 693, 1165), participated in oral arguments before
the court (R. 94, 229; Add. 10), and obtained rulings and orders from the court. (R. 345,
375; Add. 10,30,36,47-53.)
Before the court could rule on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery,
Defendants filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation on May 24, 2004.
(R. 677.) As Plaintiffs Motion to Compel production of sensitive financial information
and other electronic documents was currently pending before the court, the timing of
Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration suggested that Defendants were attempting to
avoid compelled disclosure of this information. On June 28, 2004, the district court
issued a written ruling denying Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration. (Add. 1.)
The court held that Defendants had waived arbitration by actively litigating the case for
two years, contrary to any intention to arbitrate, and that referring the case for arbitration
at this juncture would prejudice Plaintiff. Defendants appeal the district court's denial of
their Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 1136.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Pleadings and Motions to Dismiss
On April 23, 2002, Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendants alleging breach
of contract, fraud, and other tort claims. (R. 1.) The lawsuit stemmed from a dispute
over a distributor agreement the parties entered into on February 6, 1998. (Agreement,
R. 14.) The Agreement contains an arbitration clause stating, in pertinent part, that the
1

parties "agree[d] to waive trial by jury or by judge and resolve any dispute arising
between [them] with respect to matters set forth in [the Agreement] by arbitration^]"
(Agreement, 114(d), R. 20.)
Defendants filed an Answer, Counterclaim, and Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs
fraud and unjust enrichment claims. (R. 23-49.) In their Answer, Defendants asserted
nineteen affirmative defenses. Defendants' eighteenth affirmative defense stated as
follows: "This dispute is subject to mandatory binding arbitration pursuant to paragraph
14(d) of the Agreement and as required by Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 la-3." (R. 34.) This is
the only reference to arbitration in Defendants' Answer.
In their Counterclaim, Defendants alleged breach of contract and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (R. 34-37.) Defendants' allegations contained
detailed discussion and reference to some paragraphs of the Agreement, but Defendants
nowhere mentioned the arbitration clause in their Counterclaim.
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss was accompanied by a seven-page memorandum,
in which Defendants vigorously argued that the district court should dismiss Plaintiffs
fraud claims for failure to comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). (R. 46.) In addition,
Defendants urged the district court to dismiss Plaintiffs unjust enrichment claim on its
merits, citing various cases and arguing that the claim fails to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted. Defendants nowhere mentioned arbitration in their Motion to
Dismiss or accompanying memorandum. Defendants requested a hearing on their
Motion to Dismiss.
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Plaintiff filed a reply to Defendants' Counterclaim (R. 50-54), and a memorandum
in opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (R. 55-63). Defendants filed their Reply
along with a Notice to Submit. (R. 55-73.)
On September 4, 2002, pursuant to Defendants' request, the court held a hearing
on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. (Add. 10.) The court denied Defendants' Motion as
to the unjust enrichment claim but granted Defendants' Motion as to the fraud claims.
However, the court granted Plaintiff thirty days to file an amended complaint. Plaintiff
timely filed an amended complaint (R. 95), and Defendants filed a second motion to
dismiss, requesting oral argument (R. 121). Defendants' Motion was accompanied by a
five-page memorandum, again arguing that Plaintiffs fraud claims should be dismissed
for failure to comply with Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). (R. 124.) Defendants' Memorandum
never mentioned arbitration. Plaintiff filed a memorandum opposing Plaintiffs Motion
to Dismiss. (R. 130.) Defendants then filed a seven-page Reply Memorandum, which
made no mention of arbitration. (R. 154.)
On June 11, 2003, the court held a hearing on Defendants' second Motion to
Dismiss. (R. 229.) (The court also heard argument on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel,
which is discussed infra.) The court later entered a written ruling denying Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss. (Add. 30.) There is no suggestion from the record that arbitration
was mentioned at the hearing.
Discovery Prior To Motion To Compel Arbitration
Defendants actively participated in discovery for two years before filing their
Motion to Compel Arbitration. (Add. 47-53.) From June 2002 to March 2004, the

parties jointly filed a total of five scheduling orders with the court. (R. 85, 169, 216, 342,
399, Add. 7, 11, 14,28,38.)
In June 2002, counsel participated in an attorney planning meeting, submitted a
report to the district court (R. 76-79), and filed the initial scheduling order with the court
(Add. 7.)
In July 2002, the parties exchanged their first requests for discovery. (R. 74, 80.)
Defendants' discovery request consisted of thirty-five interrogatories and twenty-seven
requests for production of documents. (R. 866-80.)
In August 2002, Defendants served on Plaintiff their answers to Plaintiffs First
Set of Requests for Admission, but did not respond to Plaintiffs Interrogatories and
Requests for Production of Documents. (R. 92.)
In February 2003, Plaintiff served on Defendants thirty pages of information in
response to Defendants' first set of discovery requests. (R. 881.)
In April 2003, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel and for Sanctions, seeking to
compel Defendants to properly respond to Plaintiffs first set of discovery requests,
which were served on Defendants nine months earlier. (R. 177.) The exhibits attached to
Plaintiffs motion contained portions of the extensive correspondence between the parties
and detailed Defendants' continued failure to respond to Plaintiffs discovery requests.
(R. 201.) According to the correspondence, Defendants never suggested that their failure
to respond to Plaintiffs discovery requests was due to their desire to arbitrate. Plaintiff
also sought their attorney fees incurred in preparing the Motion. (R. 211.)
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On June 2, 2003, the court signed a minute entry noting Defendants' continued
failure to properly respond to Plaintiffs discovery requests, but delayed signing
Plaintiffs Proposed Order to Compel and for Sanctions in light of the evidence of the
parties' continued communication regarding discovery. (R. 207, Add. 13.) The next day,
Defendants filed Amended Answers to Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Admission.
(R. 220.) On June 11, 2003, a hearing was held on Plaintiffs Motion to Compel.
(R. 229.) (The court also heard argument on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, discussed
supra) After hearing oral argument, the court granted Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and
ordered Defendants to pay Plaintiffs fees incurred in preparing its motion.1 Defendants
then filed a five-page objection to Plaintiffs Affidavit of Attorney's Fees. (R. 234.) The
court eventually awarded Plaintiff its attorney fees in the amount of $1,330.00. (R. 324,
Add. 16.) Later in June, Defendants finally responded in part to Plaintiffs year-old
Interrogatories Requests for Production of Documents, but Defendants' responses were
incomplete. (R. 245, 259.)
In July 2003, the parties participated in a telephone conference with the court,
initiated by Plaintiffs counsel, to address Defendants' continued failure to respond in full
to Plaintiffs discovery requests and Defendants' representation that it was "physically
unable" to provide the requested documents because it was in the midst of a warehouse
move. (R. 362, Add. 33.) The court noted that Defendants' discovery responses were
insufficient, but, pursuant to Defendants' representation regarding the move, the court
1

The court later entered a three-page written order denying Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss and granting Plaintiffs Motion to Compel. (Add. 30.)
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granted Defendants additional time to produce the requested discovery. However, the
court indicated a willingness to levy sanctions against Defendants if Plaintiff discovered
that Defendaats' representations regarding the move were inaccurate. The court issued a
three-page written order regarding the conference call. (Add. 33.) Soon afterward, the
parties filed a ten-page Stipulation Governing the Disclosure of Confidential and
Proprietary Information and accompanying order, which the court reviewed and signed.
(R. 328, Add. 18.)
In August 2003, Plaintiffs counsel traveled to Walnut Creek, California, and spent
almost a full week at Defendants' office and document-storage facility, inspecting
hundreds of boxes of documents. (R. 383, 479.) At that time, it became clear that
Defendants' representations regarding an imminent warehouse move were entirely false.
(R. 1162. Tr. 5-6.) Later in August, Defendants served on Plaintiff its Second Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, and its First Set of Requests
for Admission. (R. 365, 1020.) The same day, Defendants sent Plaintiff a fifteen-page
letter detailing reasons why Plaintiffs response to Defendants' first set of discovery
requests was insufficient. (R. 915.) Defendants drafted and sent a similar letter two
weeks later. (R. 1161.) Plaintiff responded to Defendants' allegations in a lengthy letter
of its own. (R. 1161.)
In September and October 2003, Plaintiff supplied Defendants with hundreds of
pages of documents pursuant to Defendants' discovery requests, including responses to
Defendants' First Set of Requests for Admissions (R. 367); supplemental responses
comprising thirty-six pages of additional information (R. 1165); responses to Defendants'
8

Second Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents, consisting of
thirty-four pages of information (R. 1032); and supplemental responses, comprising
seventy-one pages of information (R. 948).
In February 2004, the parties filed a Joint Motion Regarding Plaintiffs Production
of Documents and accompanying Order (R. 373), which the court reviewed and signed.
(Add. 36.) Later that month, Defendants took four days of depositions of Plaintiff s
principals, Tan Sek-Ho Earnest Rex and Grace Chong-Tan Mo-Ai (R. 743, 1079, 1088),
who are residents of Singapore and traveled to the United States at their own expense.
(R. 691.) Defendants also participated in the depositions of five other witnesses (R. 69092), including John Reed (R. 401), David Cox (R. 402), John Warner (R. 404, 454),
Michael Williams (R. 595), and Jeffrey Jones (R. 598).
In March 2004, Defendants filed a Motion for Protective Order, seeking to protect
digital copies of its accounting information. (R. 379.) The Motion was accompanied by
a five-page memorandum and six exhibits. (R. 382.) The exhibits detailed the parties'
lengthy correspondence and numerous telephone conversations regarding discovery
issues. On March 10, 2004, the parties filed the final Case Scheduling Order, which was
reviewed and signed by the court. (Add. 38.) The Order stated that factual discovery
would be completed by August 31, 2004, expert discovery by December 31, 2004, and
that the cutoff for dispositive motions was January 31, 2005.
On March 26, 2004, Plaintiff filed a Motion to Compel production of electronic
documents. (R. 492.) Plaintiffs Motion was accompanied by a twelve-page
Memorandum in Support of its Motion to Compel and in Opposition to Defendants'
9

Motion for Protective Order. (R. 407.) Plaintiff attached nine exhibits detailing the
extensive correspondence and other communications between counsel for the parties
regarding discovery and related issues. (R. 423.) Plaintiff also included an affidavit from
the Managing Director of PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, averring as to Plaintiffs need
for and the relevance of the electronic financial data it sought from Defendants. (R. 475.)
On April 19, 2004, Defendants filed a Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Protective Order and Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion to Compel.
(R. 497.) Defendants' filing included twelve pages of legal argument with dozens of case
citations, and thirteen exhibits to the Memorandum, totaling over eighty-one pages of
material. (R. 513.) Again, the exhibits catalogued Defendants' participation in a litany
of correspondence and telephone calls with Plaintiff regarding discovery.
On May 3, 2004, Plaintiff filed its Reply in Support of Plaintiff s Motion to
Compel and in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Protective Order. (R. 599.) Before
the court could rule on the pending discovery motions, Defendants filed a Motion to
Compel Arbitration.
Motioiti to Compel Arbitration and Ruling on Discovery Motions
Over two years after Plaintiff filed its Complaint, Defendants filed a Motion to
Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation on May 24, 2004. (R. 677.) Aside from its
affirmative defenses, this was the first time Defendants raised a right to arbitration.
Plaintiff promptly opposed Defendants' Motion, demonstrating that Defendants had been
litigating the case for over two years and that sending the case to arbitration now would
severely prejudice Plaintiff. (R. 688.) Plaintiff attached twelve exhibits to its
10

memorandum detailing the extensive discovery that Defendants had engaged in and
Defendants' multiple motions and pleadings submitted to the court. (R. 699.)
On June 14, 2004, the court heard oral argument on the parties' pending discovery
motions {i.e., Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and Defendants' Motion for Protective Order)
and on Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 1162.) The parties argued their
respective discovery motions first. The court granted Plaintiffs Motion to Compel,
denied Defendants' Motion for Protective Order (R. 1162, Tr. 63), and later entered a
written ruling explaining its decision (R. 1253, Add. 40.)
The court then heard argument on Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration. In
addition to its waiver argument, counsel for Plaintiff argued that Defendants were
estopped from seeking to compel arbitration at this late date. (R. 1162, Tr. 88.)
Expressing its incredulity at Defendants' Motion, the court asked Defendants' counsel:
"Why didn't [Defendants] push this before, or is there something in the file I've missed
that they were pushing arbitration?" {Id. at 69.) The court also informed Defendants that
this was "an unusual motion to be brought this late in the game." {Id. at 49.) After taking
the matter under advisement, the court denied Defendants' Motion in a five-page written
ruling dated June 28, 2004. (Add. 1.) Under relevant case law, the court found that
Defendants participated in litigation to an extent inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate.
Specifically, the court noted:
[T]he defendants filed an answer, filed a counterclaim, filed two separate
motions to dismiss, held an attorney planning meeting, served discovery
requests upon the plaintiff and obtained substantial information, responded
to plaintiffs discovery requests, took part in conference calls, defended
depositions, took depositions in Utah of persons who reside in Singapore,
11

and finally filed a protective order relative to the production of their
electronic documents. [Add. 4.]
Moreover, the court found that forcing Plaintiff to arbitrate the case at such a late date
would prejudice Plaintiff because: (1) "[Defendants in this action have participated in
discovery far beyond that which would be allowed in arbitration"; (2) Plaintiff "has
expended substantial resources while participating in pretrial motions and discovery";
and (3) "the Iwo years of experience that [Defendants have had in this case, including
significant motion practice, has effectively allowed them to test the judicial waters." For
these reasons, the court held that Defendants had waived their right to arbitrate the
dispute. (Add. 4-5.)
Discovery Conducted After Denial of Motion To Compel Arbitration
Defendants continued to conduct discovery even after the court denied their
Motion to Compel Arbitration, including corresponding with Plaintiff regarding
discovery (R. 1069-75), participating in the depositions of Paul Dawson and Anthony
Pilaro (R. 1106, 1324), filing a Motion to Compel and for Sanctions aigainst Plaintiff
(accompanied by a thirteen-page memorandum, which included thirteen exhibits totaling
over 227 pages of documents) (R. 846), and later filing a seven-page document styled
"Report and Request for Further Court Intervention Concerning Production of Discovery
Electronic Data" (R. 1094). On July 13, 2004, the court held a hearing on the parties'
discovery motions and ordered Defendants to produce certain electronic documents to
Plaintiff within six weeks at Defendants' expense. (R. 1120.)
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On July 16, 2004, Defendants filed a Notice of Appeal from the district court's
denial of their Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 1136.) However, Defendants
continued to conduct discovery even after filing their Notice of Appeal by filing
memoranda with the court regarding discovery (R. 1243, 1259), and serving discovery
responses on Plaintiff (R. 1257, 1299).
On August 16, 2004, before the court could respond to the pending discovery
motions, Defendants filed a Motion to Determine Jurisdiction and accompanying
memorandum, arguing that their appeal of the order denying arbitration divested the court
of jurisdiction. (R. 1288.) On September 2, 2004, the court entered an order staying
further proceedings in the district court pending further direction from the appellate court.
(R. 1307, Add. 45.) On October 17, 2004, the Utah Supreme Court granted Defendants'
motion to stay proceedings in the district court pending the appeal. (R. 1319.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendants have waived the right to arbitrate by extensive participation in this
litigation for over two years. Defendants filed two motions to dismiss and actively
participated in discovery, including service of multiple discovery requests on Plaintiff
and receiving thousands of documents in response, taking four days of depositions and
participating in seven other depositions, filing a motion for protective order, responding
to Plaintiffs discovery motions, attending hearings and obtaining rulings from the district
court.
Compelled arbitration at this late date would plainly prejudice Plaintiff. Plaintiff
expended substantial recourses in responding to Defendants' motions to dismiss and
13

Defendants' other filings, conducting discovery, and in obtaining favorable rulings from
the court on Plaintiffs discovery motions. Given these facts, the district court properly
concluded that Defendants had waived their right to arbitrate this dispute by participating
in litigation to an extent inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, resulting in prejudice to
Plaintiff if arbitration is now compelled.
Allowing Defendants to arbitrate at this late date would not further public policy
that generally favors arbitration. Arbitration is intended to serve as a cost-effective and
efficient alternative to litigation, not as a second-chance forum for parties who are
disappointed with their results in a court. The fact that Defendants raised arbitration as
an affirmative defense does not require a different result when the rest of Defendants'
conduct unequivocally indicates an intent to litigate, not arbitrate. Defendants seek
arbitration now only for purposes of obfuscation and delay.
ARGUMENT
The parties' Agreement is governed by the version of the Utah Arbitration Act
(the "UAA") that was in effect when the parties entered into the Agreement.2 The
relevant provision of the UAA states that "[a] written agreement to submit any existing or
future controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon
grounds existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement^

Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-3 la-3 (2002) (emp. add.) (Add. 55). Waiver is such a ground.
2

The former UAA was repealed on May 15, 2003. However, Utah Code Ann. § 783 la-131 provides that "an arbitration agreement made before May 6, 2002 shall be
governed by the arbitration act in force on the date the agreement was signed." (Add.
57.) As the Agreement was signed February 6, 1998, Defendants agree that the 2002
version of the Utah Arbitration Act governs this appeal. (Brief of Appellants, pp. 2-3.)
14

Consistent with the language of section 78-3 la-3, it is well-established that a
contractual right to arbitration—like other contractual rights—may be waived. See Cedar
Surgery Ctr., L.L.C. v. Bonelli, 2004 UT 58,1 14, 96 P.3d 911. Indeed, Defendants do
not dispute this settled principle on appeal. The seminal Utah case on waiver as applied
to arbitration clauses is Chandler v. Blue Cross, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992), in which the
Utah Supreme Court propounded a two-part test to determine whether a litigant had
waived his right to arbitrate a particular dispute. First, the "party seeking arbitration must
participate in the litigation to a point inconsistent with arbitration." Id. at 359. Second,
the delay in seeking arbitration must result in "prejudice" to the opposing party. Id. "The
party claiming waiver has the burden of establishing substantial participation and
prejudice." Id.
As discussed below, the district court correctly applied Chandler's two-prong test
in denying Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration. After a thorough and thoughtful
analysis, the district court concluded that Defendants had waived their right to arbitration
because they actively participated in litigation for over two years, and Plaintiff would be
prejudiced by arbitration now. (Add. 3-5.) This Court should affirm that ruling.
POINT I:

A.

DEFENDANTS HAVE UNEQUIVOCALLY WAIVED THEIR
RIGHT TO ARBITRATE THIS DISPUTE.
Defendants Participated in Litigation To A Point Inconsistent With
The Intent To Arbitrate.
L

Legal Standardfor Participation in Litigation.

In Chandler v. Blue Cross, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court
was called upon to determine the "standard [that] should be employed in determining
15

whether a party has waived a contractual right of arbitration." Id. at 358. As the issue
was one of first impression for the court, it conducted a thorough review of case law from
other jurisdictions. The court recognized "the strong public policy in favor of arbitration
'as an approved, practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court
congestion.'" Id. The court also recognized, however, that "[t]he policies favoring
arbitration are largely defeated when the right of arbitration is not raised until an
opposing party has undertaken much of the expense necessary to prepare a case for trial."
Id. at 361. Moreover, the court recognized "an affirmative duty to enforce contractual
rights." Id. at 360. Accordingly, the first prong of the Chandler test asks whether the
party claiming the right to arbitrate has "participated] in litigation to a point inconsistent
with the intent to arbitrate." Id. The court cautioned that the inquiry is a fact-intensive
one, and that the outcome would vary depending on the circumstances of a particular
case.
In Chandler, the court readily found that the defendant had participated in
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate by filing an answer, filing a
cross-claim, and participating in discovery for five months. Specifically, before filing its
motion to compel arbitration, the defendant "participated in" five depositions, "circulated
a stipulation for a protective order among all parties," received two requests for
production of documents from plaintiffs and one set of interrogatories from a codefendant, and served its own set of interrogatories and requests for production on the
plaintiffs. Id. at 357. The court concluded that "[t]hese actions clearly manifest an intent
to proceed to trial." Id. at 360.
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The Utah Supreme Court expressly reaffirmed the Chandler analysis in Central
Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associates, 2002 UT 3, 40 P.3d 599. In Parhvest,
the court found no waiver, but on facts very different from those presented in Chandler
and the instant case. In Parkwest, the defendant sent the plaintiff a letter three days after
receiving the plaintiffs complaint stating that the filing of the complaint was improper
because the parties5 agreed to arbitrate any dispute that arose between them. Shortly
thereafter, the defendant filed an answer and counterclaim. The defendant did not
mention arbitration in its answer, but in its counterclaim the defendant raised the issue of
arbitration—and argued that the filing of the plaintiffs complaint breached the parties'
agreement—in over five separate instances. On the same day that the defendant filed its
answer and counterclaim, it also filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the
plaintiffs complaint should be dismissed because the parties agreed to arbitrate. The
defendant attached to its motion the letter that it previously sent to the plaintiff informing
her that her complaint was improper in light of the parties' arbitration agreement. In a
minute entry, the court indicated that it would grant the defendant's motion to dismiss as
to one of plaintiff s claims but deny it as to the other claim. Before the court entered its
order, the defendant participated in a scheduling conference, submitted a scheduling
order to the court, and provided initial disclosures to the plaintiff. The court subsequently
issued its order granting the defendant's motion in part and denying it in part. Ten days
later, the defendant filed a motion to compel arbitration as to the remaining claim, which
the trial court denied. In all, exactly four months had elapsed from filing of the
complaint.
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In determining whether the defendant had participated in litigation to the point
inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, the Parkwest court explained as follows:
[The] first part of the Chandler test looks at the actions of the party seeking
arbitration, and whether those actions evidence an intent to submit to the
jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through litigation. Participation
in discovery and other aspects of litigation that do not necessarily involve
the court are factors we consider in trying to ascertain a party's intent or
attitude toward its participation in litigation. Requests made of the court by
the parties, however, have even greater weight. We consider especially
important whether the parties' requests of the court demonstrate an intent
to pursue litigation or whether they demonstrate an intent to avoid
litigation and a desire to be sent to arbitrate. Accordingly, parties seeking
to enforce arbitration should ensure that the court, not just the opposing
party, is informed that arbitration is desired. In doing so, judicial resources
will be appropriately conserved. [Id. at ^ 26, emp. add.].
Applying Chandler to the facts before it, the court held that the defendant had not
participated in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate. In so holding,
the court recognized that the defendant had participated to a limited extent in litigation.
Id. at Tflj 27-28. However, through its letter to counsel (sent three days after the complaint
was filed) and the arguments contained in its counterclaim and motion to dismiss, based
on the right to arbitrate, the defendant clearly "apprised both [the plaintiff] and the court
of its position that litigation of the matter was improper, of its reluctance to litigate, and
of its intent to arbitrate." Id. at \ 31. Given these circumstances, the court found no
waiver of arbitration. Id. atffl[33-34.
While Chandler and Parkwest highlight the fact-intensive nature of the
"participation in litigation" prong of the Chandler test, the cases are nevertheless easily
reconciled with one another. Simply put, courts will not countenance litigants' attempts
to test the "judicial waters" by invoking the court's jurisdiction and utilizing its resources
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in a significant way before filing a motion to compel arbitration. Thus, when a party has
participated in litigation, courts will closely scrutinize that participation to determine
whether it evidences an intent to pursue redress through litigation as opposed to
arbitration. While Utah law favors arbitration as an alternative to litigation, the policy is
ill-served by forcing a party to arbitration after years of costly, full-scale litigation. As
shown below, the facts of the present case are much closer to Chandler than Parkwest.
2.

Defendants' Actions Evidence An Intent to Litigate, Not Arbitrate,

In determining whether Defendants intended to litigate this dispute in a judicial
forum, one of the most telling factors is that Defendants waited over two years before
filing a Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 1, 677.) Defendants' claimed desire to submit
this matter to arbitration simply cannot be reconciled with the length of time it took them
to properly assert that right. Indeed, many decisions have found waiver when the delay
was much less serious. See, e.g., Chandler, 833 P.2d 360 (waiver after five months);
Mano v. Geissler, 321 F. Supp. 2d 588, 594 (S.D.N.Y. 2004 (waiver after seventeen
months); Davis v. Cont'I Airlines, Inc., 59 Cal. App. 4th 205, 213 (1997) (waiver after six
months), cert, denied, 1998 Cal. LEXIS 974; Board of Educ. Taos Mun. Sch. v.
Architects, 709 P.2d 184, 185 (N.M. 1985) (waiver after one year).
Moreover, Defendants engaged in multiple rounds of attacks to the pleadings and
actively participated in discovery, which was hotly contested from the start. (R. 690-91;
Add. 47-53.) During the two years of litigation before filing their Motion to Compel
Arbitration, Defendants, inter alia, filed an answer and counterclaim (R. 23, 34); two
motions to dismiss (R. 39, 121); a motion for protective order (R. 379); a joint motion
1Q

regarding production of documents (R. 373); and five joint motions regarding
scheduling. Defendants also responded to Plaintiffs discovery requests (R. 92, 220,
245); served two sets of discovery, and received thousands of documents in response;4
took two depositions and participated in seven more (R. 690-91, 693); participated in oral
argument before the court on two occasions and in a conference call on another occasion
(Add. 10, 33; R. 229); and generated stacks of correspondence regarding discovery (R.
201, 382, 915). Even after Defendants filed their Motion to Compel, they continued to
correspond with Plaintiff regarding discovery (R. 1069-75), participated in two
depositions (R. 1106, 1324), filed two discovery motions (R. 846, 1094), responded to
Plaintiffs discovery motion (R. 1243), and served discovery responses on Plaintiff (R.
1257, 1299).
In Chandler, the court readily found "an intent to proceed to trial" given the fivemonth delay during which time defendant filed an answer and cross-claim, participated in
five depositions, circulated a protective order, received two sets of discovery from
plaintiffs and served its own set of discovery on the plaintiffs. Id. at 357, 360.
Defendants' participation in this case far exceeds the participation found to constitute
waiver in Chandler. Given this extensive participation, it would be a serious deviation
from Chandler to hold that defendants have not waived their right to arbitrate in this case.
Moreover, Defendants' participation in litigation far exceeds that of Chandler on a
qualitative scale as well as a quantitative one. The defendant in Chandler filed no

3
4

(Add. 7, 11, 14,28,36,38.)
(R. 866, 881, 367, 1165, 1032, 948.)
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dispositive motions nor did it become embroiled in discovery disputes requiring the trial
court's attention, yet the court still found waiver. In this case, Defendants made
numerous requests of the district court, which, under Parkwest, carry "great[ ] weight" in
determining a party's intent. 2002 UT 3 at f 26. Specifically, before filing their Motion
to Compel Arbitration in this case, Defendants filed a counterclaim (R.34); two motions
to dismiss (R. 39, 121); a motion for protective order (R. 379); and filed jointly with
Plaintiff one motion regarding production of documents and five scheduling orders.5 In a
defensive posture, Defendants vigorously opposed Plaintiffs' Motions with extensive
legal memoranda and exhibits. (R. 234, 497.) In fact, Defendants filed hundreds of
papers with the district court, contributing in large part to the 1,333-page record on
appeal. (Add. 47-53.) In addition, the district court held hearings and listened to oral
arguments on three occasions (Add. 10, 33; R. 229), issued seven rulings, four of which
were written rulings; and reviewed and signed eight orders pertaining to the case.
Plainly, Defendants' filings and requests of the court demonstrate an intent "to submit to
the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through litigation." Parkwest, 2002 UT 3,
126.
Despite Defendants' extensive participation in litigation, Defendants attempt to
align the facts of the instant case with those of Parkwest. First, relying on Parkwest,
Defendants argue that a finding of waiver is precluded because they raised arbitration as

5

(Add. 7, 11, 14,28,36,38.)
(R. 327, 821; Add. 10, 13, 30, 40, 43.)
7
(R. 324; Add. 7, 11, 14, 16,18,28,36,38.)
6
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an affirmative defense. (Brief of Appellants at p. 14-15.) Second, Defendants argue that
their participation in litigation was reluctant and unwilling, as in Parkwest. (Brief of
Appellants at pp. 15-16.) Neither of Defendants' arguments withstands scrutiny.
As for Defendants' first argument, it must be remembered that the defendant in
Parkwest raised arbitration with the plaintiff and with the trial court on multiple
occasions. First, the defendant corresponded with the plaintiff three days after receiving
the complaint, informing her that the complaint was improper in light of the parties'
agreement to arbitrate. 2002 UT 3 at ^ 3. In contrast, Defendants here did not so much
as hint at arbitration in any of their correspondence with Plaintiff, which was voluminous.
(R. 408.) Then the defendant in Parkwest filed a counterclaim which was literally
peppered with references to arbitration. 2002 UT 3 at ^f 5. In contrast, Defendants in this
case never mentioned arbitration in their counterclaim. (R. 34). The defendant in
Parkwest filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, inter alia, that the plaintiffs complaint
should be dismissed because the parties agreed to arbitrate. 2002 UT 3 at f 6. By
contrast, Defendants in this case never mentioned arbitration in either of their two
motions to dismiss. (R. 46, 121.) And importantly, the defendant in Parkwest waited
only four months before filing a motion to compel arbitration, during which time it
conducted extremely minimal discovery by participating in a scheduling conference,
submitting an accompanying order, and providing initial disclosures to the plaintiff.
2002 UT 3 at ^[ 8-9. By contrast, as detailed at length above, Defendants participated
extensively in discovery and waited two years before filing a motion to compel
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arbitration. (Add. 47-53.) Due to the stark contrast between the two cases, Defendants'
reliance on Parkwest is unavailing.
Moreover, the fact that Defendants mentioned arbitration as one of numerous
affirmative defenses in their answers is not enough to excuse their two-year active
participation in litigation, when all other facts belie any intent to arbitrate. For example,
in Mano v. Geissler, supra, the plaintiff filed a complaint against the defendants based on
an agreement containing an arbitration clause. The parties proceeded to litigate the case
over the next seventeen months. For the defendants' part, they answered the complaint,
"conducted extensive pre-trial discovery, including the taking of plaintiff s deposition,
sought the aid of th[e c]ourt to resolve a discovery dispute and participated in three
conferences." 321 F. Supp. at 594. Three months before trial, the defendants filed a
motion to compel arbitration. Applying a test substantially similar to the Chandler test,
the court held that "[t]he fact that defendants let seventeen months elapse before filing
their motion shortly before trial supports a finding of waiver." Id. Moreover, the court
concluded as follows:
The mere fact that defendants included the existence of the
Arbitration Clause as an affirmative defense in their Answer does not
require a different result. When a complaint has been filed in a judicial
forum, the proper way for a defendant to assert an entitlement to arbitration
is by way of motion, not by pleading it as an affirmative defense or a
counterclaim in his answer. Th[e waiver] analysis does not place any
special emphasis upon whether the defendant mentioned the existence of an
agreement to arbitrate in his answer. [Id. at 595, internal citations omitted,
emp. add.]
Similarly, in Davis v. Continental Airlines, supra, the defendants raised arbitration
as an affirmative defense but then waited six months to file a motion to compel
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arbitration. In the meantime, the defendants availed themselves of court discovery
procedures to obtain documents and to take the plaintiffs deposition. The court rejected
the "[d]efendants['] claim that because they raised [arbitration] as an affirmative defense
in their answers, they cannot possibly be held to have waived arbitration, no matter what
their conduct subsequent to filing their answers." 59 Cal. App. 4th at 215-16. Such an
argument, the court held, "is not persuasive and is not supported by the authorities
defendants cite." Id. at 216. In concluding that the defendants had waived their right to
arbitrate by eivailing themselves of judicial discovery procedures, id. at 217, the court
pointed out that "[a] defendant may not merely assert failure to arbitrate as an affirmative
Q

defense but must seek a stay and demand arbitration." Id. at 216 n.3.
Like the defendants in the above cases, Defendants raised arbitration as a defense
but then did not so much as hint at it again, despite their extensive communications with
The holdings of Mano and Davis—that raising arbitration as a defense does not
preclude a finding of waiver—is well-supported by other decisions. See, e.g.,
Sobremonte v. Superior Court, 72 Cal. ELptr. 2d 43, 54 (Ct. App. 1998) ("Mere
announcement of the right to compel arbitration [as an affirmative defense] is not enough.
To properly invoke the right to arbitrate, a party must (1) timely raise the defense and
take affirmative steps to implement the process, and (2) participate in conduct consistent
with the intent to arbitrate the dispute."); Board of Educ. Taos Mun. Sch. v. Architects,
supra, 709 P.2d at 187 ("Mere mention of such a right as an affirmative defense in the
answer to a complaint does suffice to keep the right alive. The right expires, however,
when the parly asserting it takes significant action inconsistent with the right. Waiver of
the right may be inferred from any decision to take advantage of the judicial system,
whether through discovery or direct invocation of the court's discretionary power, or
both."); De Sapio v. Kohlmeyer, 321 N.E.2d 770, 772-73 (N.Y. 1974) (despite the fact
that defendant raised the right to arbitration in his answer, defendant waived the right by
taking plaintiffs deposition because "utilization of judicial discovery procedures is . . . an
affirmative acceptance of the judicial forum" and "[t]he courtroom may not be used as a
convenient vestibule to the arbitration hall so as to allow a party to create his own unique
structure combining litigation and arbitration").
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Plaintiff and with the court during the two-year period, during which time they
participated extensively in discovery and other litigation. (R. 388-96, 423-53; Add. 4753.) If merely raising arbitration as a defense were enough to preserve the right,
regardless of a party's subsequent conduct, a party could raise arbitration as an
affirmative defense and then litigate a dispute for several years before bringing a motion
to compel arbitration. Defendants cite no authority to support this proposition.
The second way in which Defendants attempt to bring this case within the ambit of
Parkwest is by characterizing their participation in the underlying litigation as "reluctant
and unwilling" due to their purported desire to arbitrate. (Brief of Appellants at pp. 1516.) In Parkwest, the court characterized the defendant's participation as "reluctant and
unwilling" because the defendant explicitly notified the opposing party and the court via
its correspondence, pleadings, and motion to dismiss that the filing of the plaintiffs
complaint was wrongful because the parties had agreed to arbitrate. 2002 UT 3 at f12931. Moreover, the defendant's involvement in discovery was exceedingly limited, and it
waited only four months to file its motion to compel arbitration. Id. at ^ff 8-9.
In this case, by contrast, the only evidence of "reluctance" that Defendants point to
is their dilatory conduct during discovery, which forced Plaintiff to file two motions to
compel (R. 177, 492), required the district court to hold two hearings and enter multiple
rulings and orders, and which finally culminated in sanctions against Defendants (R. 229,
718; Add. 18, 33). In reality, Defendants' argument amounts to what must be an
extremely rare bid wherein they ask this Court to reward them for their dilatory tactics in
conducting discovery below. It bears emphasizing that it is not enough under Parkwest
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to be "reluctant" to litigate (a category in which many litigants would find themselves),
but the reluctance must be due to an intent to arbitrate, not litigate. 2002 UT 3 f 29.
If Defendants were truly unwilling to participate in litigation due to their purported
desire to arbitrate, that unwillingness was not manifest. In the stacks of correspondence
generated in this litigation (much of it generated by Defendants), Defendants never so
much as hinted that their stalling tactics were due to the purported desire to arbitrate.
(R. 388-96, 423-53.) And aside from their affirmative defenses, Defendants never raised
arbitration in any of their motions and memoranda or at any of their appearances before
the district court prior to filing their Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 34, 39, 121, 299,
373, 379; Add. 10, 33, 47-53.) Defendants' assertions on appeal simply cannot be
reconciled with their actions below. Without doubt, Defendants have participated in
litigation to an extent inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate.
5. Defendants' Policy Arguments Are Unpersuasive.
Defendants spend a great deal of time touting the "strong Utah policy favoring
arbitration" and arguing that this policy inexorably precludes a finding of waiver in this
case. (Brief of Appellants, p. 14.) Conspicuously absent from Defendants' brief,
however, is the actual reason Utah law favors arbitration: it is to encourage potential
litigants to arbitrate, not litigate. See Buckner v. Kennard, 2004 UT 78, f 17, 99 P.3d 842
("The use of arbitration as an alternative to traditional judicial proceedings should . . . be
encouraged.") (Emp. add.) Accordingly, the policy is "largely defeated when the right of
arbitration is not raised until an opposing party has undertaken much of the expense
necessary to prepare a case for trial." Chandler, supra, 833 P.2d at 361; see also
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Buckner, supra, 2004 UT 78 at ^ 17 ("Arbitration proceedings benefit the parties by
providing 'a method more expeditious and less expensive [than the court system] for the
resolution of disputes.'") (Alteration in original, citation omitted.) Consequently, when
litigation has not been avoided—but has been actively pursued for two years—any
presumption of non-waiver dissipates.
Requiring early exercise of arbitration rights serves public policy in several
respects. First, parties are on notice that a contractual right to arbitration, as any other
contractual right, must be affirmatively enforced within a reasonable period of time. See
Cedar Surgery Ctr.3 supra, 2004 UT 58 at 1f 14, Chandler, supra, 833 P.2d at 360.
Second, litigants are not tempted to try their luck at litigation for months or even years
(as in this case), only to force arbitration after finding unsuccessful results in litigation.
See De Sapio, supra, 321 N.E.2d at 772-73 ("[t]he courtroom may not be used as a
convenient vestibule to the arbitration hall"). When the policy of arbitration is fleshed
out and discussed in a meaningful fashion, it is clear that allowing Defendants to arbitrate
at this juncture would not support—but would in fact flout—Utah policy regarding
arbitration. For these reasons, Defendants' policy arguments ring especially hollow.9

9

Whilst conceding that the former version of the UAA controls, Defendants
nevertheless urge the Court to base its decision on Defendants' interpretation of the new
act. (Brief of Appellants, p. 21-23.) The Court should decline Defendants' request, as it
is undisputed that the new act is inapplicable to this appeal. In any event, Defendants'
position is not helped by relying on the new act, as the waiver provision in the new act is
nearly identical to that of the former act. The former version states: "A written
agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable,
and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or equity to set aside the agreement,
or when fraud is alleged as provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Utah Code
Ann. § 78-3 la-3 (2002) (emphasis added). (Add. 55.) Similarly, the new version states:
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B.

Compelling Arbitration Would Prejudice Plaintiff Because of the
Time And Resources Spent Litigating This Case For Two Years

If the first prong of Chandler is satisfied, i.e., the party seeking arbitration has
"participate[d] in the litigation to a point inconsistent with arbitration," the determination
of waiver "rests solely on a finding of prejudice." Chandler, supra, 833 P.2d at 359.
1. Legal Standard For A Finding Of Prejudice.
Prejudice "must result from the delay in the assertion of the right to arbitrate, not
from factors that are inherent in arbitration itself, such as the severance of a claim or
limitations on remedies." Chandler, supra, 833 P.2d at 359. In examining dozens of
waiver cases from other jurisdictions, the Chandler court recognized that "there is
general agreement concerning the prejudicial nature of certain factual situations." Id.
Courts have recognized that prejudice can occur if a party gains an
advantage in arbitration through participation in pretrial procedures. Courts
have also stated that prejudice exists when the party seeking arbitration is
attempting to forum-shop after "the judicial waters [have] . . . been tested."
In addition, prejudice has been found in situations where the party seeking
arbitration allows the opposing party to undergo the types of expenses that
arbitration is designed to alleviate, such as the expense of preparing to
argue important pretrial motions or the expense of conducting discovery
procedures that are not available in arbitration. [Id., footnotes and citations
omitted.]
[cont.] "An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or
subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable,
and irrevocable except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the revocation of
a contract." Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-107(l) (emp. add). As the district court pointed
out in its ruling denying Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration, one of the grounds
that "exists at law" for the revocation of an agreement is the doctrine of waiver (Add. 3),
and this is the same under both the old and the new act. Even under the new act, a trial
court need not order the parties to arbitrate if "it finds that there is no enforceable
agreement to arbitrate," as the court found in this case based on waiver. Utah Code Ann.
§78-31a-108(l)(b).
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Logically, then, courts should not "allow a party to suffer prejudice because an opposing
party has failed to timely assert a contractual right." Id. at 360.
In Chandler, the court concluded that "prejudice was apparent from [the
defendant's] participation in discovery" as well as the fact that "there are multiple
defendants in the case." Id. The court observed that through the discovery process the
defendants were able to glean information regarding their defenses in the case,
information that "could now be used in arbitration to the detriment of [the] plaintiffs."
Id. 361. Moreover, the court recognized that discovery was available only to "a limited
degree" in arbitration, and that the defendants thereby obtained a benefit "from its delay
in the assertion of the right to arbitrate that would not have been available had [it] timely
moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration." Id. Finally, the court found
plaintiffs were prejudiced by the expense they "undertook in conducting discovery into
[defendant's] liability and in preparing to respond to [defendant's] discovery request."
Id.
Although Chandler is the only Utah case to address prejudice in the context of
waiver of arbitration,10 Chandler's characterization of prejudice is well-supported by
other cases. For example, in Taos, supra, (cited in Chandler), the Supreme Court of New
Mexico substantiated Chandler's depiction of arbitration, "tak[ing] judicial notice of the
fact that the scope of discovery is considerably diminished under arbitration, a result of
the trade-off in favor of efficient and speedy resolution." 709 P.2d at 186. Moreover, the
10

As the first prong of Chandler was not satisfied in Parlew est, the Utah Supreme
Court did not address prejudice in that case.
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court agreed that prejudice often occurs when a party is induced to participate in the
discovery process, which "can be a substantial burden, both of money and time." Id. For
these reasons, the court held that the plaintiff was prejudiced when the defendant
propounded interrogatories on the plaintiff before filing a motion to compel arbitration.
Id. at 185-86.
Similarly, in Snelling & Smiling, Inc. v. Reynolds, 140 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (D. Fla.
2001), the court noted that "the length of delay in demanding arbitration and the expense
incurred by the opposing party" are both valid factors in determining whether prejudice
has occurred. Id. at 1322. Thus, "[a] substantial invocation of the litigation process that
is combined with forcing the opposing party to litiga[te] issues [that] could have been
alleviated through arbitration^ is a sufficient finding of prejudice to constitute a waiver."
Id. at 1323. In Snelling, the court found prejudice where the defendants "waited over
fourteen months before filing a motion to compel arbitration" during which time the
plaintiffs "incurred the expense of responding to [the defendants' discovery requests"
and were forced to litigate the defendants' summary judgment motion on two of the
plaintiffs' claims. Id. at 1322-23. n

11

AccordHoxworth v. Blinder, 980 F.2d 912, 926-27 (3 rd Cir. 1992) (finding "ample
record of prejudice" where defendants waited eleven months to file a motion to compel
arbitration and, in the meantime, participated in pretrial proceedings, filed a motion to
dismiss contesting the merits of plaintiffs' claims, took multiple depositions, and
prompted plaintiffs to file discovery motions by their conduct during discovery); Liggett
& Myers Inc. v. Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044, 1047-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (finding
prejudice where third-party defendant waited ten months before moving to compel
arbitration, during which time defendant "actively participated in the deposition of parties
or witnesses" and "examined and made copies of documents," including "transcripts of
all depositions taken prior to his entry into the case," which procedures would not have
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In summary, prejudice is demonstrated when the party seeking to compel
arbitration: (1) "gains an advantage in arbitration through participation in pretrial
procedures" such as discovery, Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359; (2) attempts to test the
"judicial waters" by litigating, id.; or (3) causes the opposing party to incur expenses in
discovery or in responding to pretrial motions, id., especially when those motions contest
the merits of the opposing parties' claims, Hoxworth, 980 F.2d at 927. Of course, the
length of delay is an important consideration in all three types of prejudice. See Snelling,
140 F. Supp.2datl322.
2. The Elements of Prejudice Are Manifest in This Case.
The district court correctly concluded that all three types of prejudice identified in
Chandler are present in the instant case. (Add. 4-5.) First, Defendants have gained an
advantage through litigating this dispute that would not be available to them in arbitration
and that "could now be used in arbitration to the detriment of [P]laintiff[]." Chandler,
supra, 833 P.2d at 361. As the court recognized in Chandler, discovery is available only
to "a limited degree" in arbitration. 833 P.2d 361. Indeed this proposition is so wellestablished that most courts merely note as much in passing, see, e.g., Liggett, supra, 380
F. Supp. at 1047-48, or in the alternative, take judicial notice of the fact. Taos, supra,
709 P.2d at 186. Of course, the sole reason arbitration exists is to provide "'a method
[cont] been available in arbitration); Sobremonte, supra, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54 (finding
prejudice where defendant waited ten months before moving to compel arbitration,
during which time defendant "used the judicial process" to its advantage by filing
demurrers to plaintiffs' claims and propounded discovery on plaintiffs, because such
tactics caused plaintiffs to incur costs and expenses and unwittingly disclose trial
strategies).
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more expeditious and less expensive [than the court system] for the resolution of
disputes.'" Buckner, supra, 2004 UT 78,^ 17. If, as Defendants argue, discovery were
allowed on the same scale in arbitration as in litigation (and thereby as expensive and
time-consuming as litigation), there would be little reason for an alternative forum.
Moreover, in speculating that discovery in this case is "perfectly consistent with
what would be allowed in arbitration," Defendants seriously mischaracterize their
participation in discovery thus far. (Brief of Appellants, p. 19.) While Defendants took
two depositions, they participated in nine depositions total.

i^

Moreover, Defendants did

not receive responses to only one set of discovery requests, as they allege. (Brief of
Appellants, p. 19.) Defendants served discovery requests on Plaintiff in July 2002 (R.
866), and in August 2003 (R. 365), long before they filed their Motion to Compel
Arbitration in May 2004, and Plaintiff responded to both of those discovery requests (R.
367, 881, 1032). Moreover, at Defendants' urging (R. 915, 1161), Plaintiffs
supplemented their discovery responses on multiple occasions (R. 88 I, 948, 1165). By
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In arguing that they have gained no unfair advantage by litigating this dispute for
two years, Defendants cite various provisions of the Rules of the American Arbitration
Association ("AAA"). However, none of the rules Defendants cite supports Defendants'
position. Even assuming this case fits within the criteria for "Large, Complex Comerica
Disputes," as Defendants allege, those rules state that the scope of discovery is entirely
within the arbitrator's discretion. (Brief of Appellant, Ex. 3, Rule L-3(a)-(j)). In fact,
depositions may be wholly excluded from arbitration proceedings: Rule L-3(f) states that
"matters to be considered" at the preliminary hearing include "whether, and the extent to
which, any sworn statements and/or depositions may be introduced." (Emp. add.)
Likewise, Rule L-4(c) states that "the arbitrator(s) may place such limitations on the
conduct of such discovery as the arbitrator(s) shall deem appropriate." (Brief of
Appellants, Ex. 3.)
13

(R. 743, 1079, 1088, 401, 402, 404, 595, 598, 1106, 1324.)
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Plaintiffs estimate, it provided Defendants over 3,200 documents in discovery. (R. 693.)
Moreover, Defendants say nothing of the motions and memoranda filed in this litigation
by both parties, wherein Plaintiff was induced to "unwittingly disclose [its] strategies."
Sobremonte, supra, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 54. Given the length of time Defendants
participated in discovery and the volume of documents they obtained, the district court
correctly concluded that Defendants obtained an advantage in litigation that would
prejudice Plaintiff if forced to arbitrate at this late date.
Plaintiff has also incurred the second type of prejudice identified in Chandler in
that—as the district court pointed out—it has expended a great deal of time and resources
litigating this case. (Add. 5.) In response, Defendants advance the startling proposition
that Plaintiffs counsel may be litigating this case for free or may have entered into some
other atypical arrangement with Plaintiff. (Brief of Appellants, p. 18.) However,
Defendants know that Plaintiff has incurred attorney fees because they bitterly contested
Plaintiffs attorney fees that Defendants were ordered to pay in conjunction with
Plaintiffs first motion to compel. (R. 229, 345.) Thus, as is well-documented in
Defendants' five-page Objection to Plaintiffs Affidavit for Attorney's Fees, Plaintiffs
counsel is not litigating this case for free or for a discounted rate. (R. 211, 234.) Plaintiff
has been litigating this case for two years, during which time it filed and responded to
several motions and prepared and responded to extensive discovery. (Add. 47-53.) As
just two examples of Plaintiff s expenses, Plaintiffs lawyers traveled to Defendants'
office in California and spent nearly one week reviewing documents at Defendants'
warehouse. (R. 383, 479.) Moreover, Plaintiffs principals traveled to Salt Lake City
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from Singapore for four days of depositions conducted by Defendants. (R. 691, 743,
1079, 1088.)
Finally, the third type of prejudice exists in this case because Defendants' conduct
demonstrates a blatant attempt "to forum-shop after 'the judicial waters [have] . .. been
tested.5" Chandler, supra, 833 P.2d at 359 (citation omitted). Defendants were
ultimately unsuccessful in getting any of Plaintiff s claims dismissed with their two
motions to dismiss. (Add. 10, 30.) Defendants were also unsuccessful in resisting
Plaintiffs discovery requests and were ordered to pay Plaintiffs attorney fees incurred in
preparing its motion to compel. (R. 229 Add. 16.) Defendants were also chastised by
the court on more than one occasion for failure to respond to discovery. (Add. 33.)
Defendants have resisted producing their electronic financial information and
correspondence throughout discovery, and even filed a Motion for Protective Order.
(R. 379.) Three days before Defendants filed their Notice of Appeal, the court ordered
Defendants to produce these electronic documents and to bear the expense of doing so.
(R. 1120.) It is not surprising, then, that Defendants now make a last-ditch effort to
postpone resolution of Plaintiff s claims by invoking arbitration and staying the litigation.
However, the Court should not countenance Defendants' attempt to exploit the judicial
system in this fashion, engaging in litigation and then invoking arbitration for apparent
tactical purposes of obfiiscation and delay.
In summary, the district court correctly concluded that Defendants waived their
right to arbitrate because Defendants participated in litigation to an extent inconsistent
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with the intent to arbitrate, and sending the case to arbitration at this late date would
plainly prejudice Plaintiff.
POINT II:

AFTER LITIGATING THIS DISPUTE FOR OVER TWO YEARS,
DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM NOW ASSERTING A
RIGHT TO ARBITRATION.

The purpose of the equitable doctrine of estoppel is "'to rescue from loss a party
who has, without fault, been deluded into a course of action by the wrong or neglect of
another.5" Plateau Mining Co v. Utah Div. of State Lands & Forestry, 802 P.2d 720, 728
(Utah 1990) (quoting Morgan v. Bd. of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976).
"The elements of estoppel are '(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the
claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party on the faith of such admission,
statement, or act, and (3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing the first party
to contradict or repudiate such admission, statement, or act.'" Id. (quoting Celebrity
Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm 'n, 602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979)). Accord
Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Utah App. 1990).
As discussed at length above, Defendants actively litigated this case for two years
before bringing their Motion to Compel Arbitration. Defendants' actions were manifestly
"inconsistent with the claim afterwards asserted," i.e., a claimed right to arbitrate this
dispute. Plateau Mining, supra, 802 P.2d at 728. Moreover, Plaintiff spent countless
hours and many thousands of dollars litigating this dispute on the good faith belief that
Defendants had knowingly submitted to a judicial forum. (Add. 47-53; R. 690-91.) For
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these reasons, forcing Plaintiff to arbitrate the dispute at this juncture would severely
prejudice Plaintiff. (Add. 4-5; R. 693-95.)14
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the district court's order denying
Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration.
DATED this / ^ d a y of March, 2005.
KIRTON & McCONKIE

David M. Wahlquist
Merrill F. Nelson
Karina F. Landward
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee

14

This Court may also affirm the district court's decision on the alternative ground of
laches. See Dipoma, supra, 2001 UT 61, at \ 18. "To constitute laches, two elements
must be established: (1) The lack of diligence on the part of [a claimant]; (2) An injury to
[the party claiming laches] owing to such lack of diligence." Papanikolas Bros. Enter, v.
Sugarhouse Shopping Ctr. Assoc, 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). Defendants' twoyear delay in bringing their motion to compel arbitration shows lack of diligence in
pursuing arbitration. As Defendants argue in their brief, they knew about and folly
realized the implications of the arbitration clause when they filed their first answer on
May 30, 2002. (R. 23.) Yet Defendants did nothing to enforce that right until two years
later, after Plaintiff had expended many hours and many thousands of dollars litigating
this dispute. (Add. 47-53.) Defendants advance no excuse for their lack of diligence, and
they should not be rewarded for sitting on their hands for two years at Plaintiffs expense.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT

i

Third Judicial District
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

m

?

g

SALT LAKE

^h
cotyrv <^jr) _

SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a
Singapore limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

RULING AND ORDER

vs.
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC.,
A Utah corporation, and BRITESMILE,
INC., a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

Case No. 020903521
Judge Robert K. Hilder

Defendants' Motion to Compel Arbitration and Stay Litigation was argued to the court on
June 14, 2004. Following argument, the court took the matter under advisement. Now, having
considered the memoranda, arguments, and applicable law, the court DENIES the Motion for the
following
x reasons:
&

INTRODUCTION
On April 23, 2002, Smile Inc. Asia Pte, Ltd. ("plaintiff) filed a complaint against
Britesmile Management, Inc. and Britesmile, Inc. ("defendants"). Plaintiffs original complaint
contained nine claims for relief, originating in a contract between the parties dated February 6,
1998. On May 21, 2004, more than two years after the Complaint was filed, defendant first
asked the court to enforce a provision in the original contract that required arbitration of any
disputes between the parties. Before filing their Motion to Compel Arbitration, defendants
participated in the litigation by answering the complaint; counterclaiming against plaintiff; filing
motions to dismiss; being involved in attorney planning meetings; and participating in a lengthy
discovery process involving numerous motions. The issue now before the court is whether
defendants have waived their right to compel arbitration in this matter.
Contrary to defendants' position, the applicable Utah Arbitration Act does not preclude a
finding of waiver. The Utah Supreme Court has held that when a parties take certain actions,
1

they can waive their right to arbitration. In Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356,
360 (Utah 1992). the court held that "waiver of a right of arbitration must be based on both a
finding of participation in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate and a
finding of prejudice." The court further explained that prejudice consists of a delay in the
assertion to arbitrate, as well as real harm suffered by the party opposing arbitration. Id. at 360.
Because defendants allege that a newer version of the Utah Arbitration Act applies to this
action, this Ruling will first address which version the Utah Arbitration Act applies to this
Motion. The court will then consider whether defendants substantially participated in the
litigation in a manner that is inconsistent with arbitration and, if so, whether plaintiff will suffer
prejudice if the motion to compel arbitration is granted.
DISCUSSION
1.

The 2002 Version of the Act Does Not Apply to This Motion.

Defendants reliance on the updated version of the Utah Arbitration Act to support their
motion to compel arbitration is misplaced. In defendants' memorandum in support of their
motion to compel arbitration, defendants argue that Section 78-31a-107(l) of the Utah Uniform
Arbitration Act requires arbitration in this matter. At oral argument, defendants further argued
that the updated Act no longer allows waiver of the right to arbitrate. Defendants argued that
Utah case law decided before the implementation of the updated code, which interpreted the
statute as allowing waiver, is no longer valid. However, the updated Act itself invalidates this
argument.
Section 78-31a-104. Utah Code Ann. Expressly states that: "this chapter applies to any
agreement to arbitrate made on or after May 6, 2002. The only exception that addresses
agreements before that date is set forth in sub-section (2), which provides that the updated code
"applies to any agreement to arbitrate made before May 6, 2002, if all the parties to the
agreement or to the arbitration proceeding agree on the record, (emphasis added). No such
agreement has been made between the parties on the record and the agreement containing the
arbitration clause was signed on February 6, 1998.
Section 78-31a-131 further provides that the act "does not affect an atction or proceeding
commenced or right accrued before this chapter takes effect. Subject to Section 78-3 la-104 of
this chapter, an arbitration agreement made before May 6, 2002 shall be governed by the
arbitration act in force on the date the agreement was signed." (emphasis added). This action
commenced on April 23, 2002, when plaintiffs filed their complaint. Considering both factors
(date of agreement and date of commencement of the action) this Motion is governed by the Act
as it was construed in Chandler and Parkwest. Both the commencement of the action and the
signing of the agreement containing the arbitration clause occurred before May 6, 2002, meaning
that the arbitration act that applies is the one "in force on the date the agreement was signed."
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The court also finds that even if the 2002 Act applied, defendants' assertion that waiver is
no longer allowed is unpersuasive. In their memorandum, defendants quote Section 78-31 a107(1), which provides:
An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration
any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the
parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable
except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the
revocation of a contract.
One of the grounds that "exists at law" for the revocation of an arbitration agreement (or
any contract) is the doctrine of waiver. For this reason, defendants cannot rely on this language
in their motion to compel arbitration. Defendants also quote Section 78-31a-108(l)(b) of the
Act, which states that when one party opposes a motion to compel arbitration, "the court shall
proceed summarily to decide the issue and order the parties to arbitrate unless it finds that there
is no enforceable agreement to arbitrate." (emphasis added). Based on this language,
defendants argue that the updated Arbitration Act does not allow a waiver of the right to
arbitrate. However, the Act itself gives the court the opportunity to "find" whether there is an
"enforceable agreement to arbitrate." The enforceability of an arbitration agreement will often
hinge on whether a party has waived its right to arbitrate, as illustrated in earlier case law. See
Chandler, 833 P.2d at 360.
2. Defendants Substantially Participated in the Present Litigation in a Manner
Inconsistent With An Intent to Arbitrate.
Because the defendants filed an answer, filed a counterclaim, participated in discovery for
a lengthy amount of time, and reviewed that discovery, they have substantially participated in the
present litigation in a manner inconsistent with arbitration. Chandler held that the first
requirement for a waiver of arbitration rights is "participation in litigation to a point inconsistent
with the intent to arbitrate." 833 P.2d at 360. The Utah Supreme Court again stated this rule in
Central Florida Investments, Inc. v. Parkwest Associations, 40 P.3d 599, 608 (Utah 2002). The
court held that the party seeking arbitration must "substantially participate in the litigation, to a
point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate." Id. at 608.
In Chandler, the court held that the defendants had waived their right to arbitration. The
court noted that the defendant:
participated in the litigation to a point inconsistent with arbitration.
Before [defendants] moved to compel arbitration, [they] filed an
answer, filed a cross-claim, participated in discovery for five months,
and reviewed the discovery that had already taken place prior to
[their] entrance into the case. These actions clearly manifest an intent
to proceed to trial.

3

833 P.2dat360.
In Chandler, these actions were sufficient to "clearly manifest an intent to proceed to
trial." In Parkwest, where the court held that the defendant had not waived the right to
arbitration, the court held that "parties seeking to enforce arbitration should ensure that the court,
not just the opposing party, is informed that arbitration is desired." 40 P.3d at 609. The court
noted that defendants, although participating in a few pretrial motions before filing their motion
to compel arbitration, mentioned arbitration as on option several times, including in a letter
directed to plaintiff; a motion to dismiss; and in a counterclaim. Id. at 610. The court paid
particular attention to evidence suggesting that the defendants had always participated in the
litigation (as opposed to arbitration) reluctantly. Id
This case is factually much closer to Chandler than to Parkwest. Like the defendants in
Chandler, defendants in the present action participated extensively in the litigation before filing
their motion to compel arbitration. Defendants: filed an answer, filed a counterclaim, filed two
separate motions to dismiss, held an attorney planning meeting, served discovery requests upon
the plaintiff and obtained substantial information, responded to plaintiffs discovery requests,
took part in conference calls, defended depositions, took depositions in Utah of persons who
reside in Singapore, and finally filed a protective order relative to the production of their
electronic documents. It is of particular interest that defendants did not file their motion to
compel arbitration until May 21, 2004, over two years after the original complaint was filed.
Unlike the defendants in Parkwest, defendants here only mentioned the arbitration clause once,
in their original Answer to the complaint. Defendants never took any measures to "ensure" that
the court knew of their desire to arbitrate this matter.
Considering the facts set forth above, it is clear that defendants did not originally intend
to have this matter arbitrated, but seriously contemplated it only after two years of litigation.
Therefore, defendants fulfill the first requirement for waiver under binding Utah case law.
3.
Arbitrate.

Prejudice Would Occur if Defendants Were Allowed to Compel Plaintiff to

Because defendants greatly delayed their assertion of the arbitration provision, and
because plaintiffs (and defendants) have incurred great expense in this litigation, granting
defendants' motion to compel arbitration would create prejudice in this dispute. The Utah
Supreme Court has identified three independent factors that each point toward prejudice:
[T]here is a general agreement concerning the prejudicial nature
of certain factual situations. Courts have recognized that prejudice
can occur if (1) a party gains an advantage in arbitration through
participation in pretrial procedures. Courts have also stated that
prejudice exists when (2) the party seeking arbitration is attempting to
forum-shop after "the judicial waters [have] ... been tested." In
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addition, prejudice has been found in situations where (3) the party
seeking arbitration allows the opposing party to undergo the types
of expenses that arbitration is designed to alleviate, such as the
expense of preparing to argue important pretrial motions or the
expense of conducting discovery procedures that are not available
in arbitration.
Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359 (footnote and citations omitted; numbers added).
In Chandler, the court found that granting the motion to compel arbitration would create
prejudice because: the defendants participated in "extensive discovery" beyond that which would
be allowed in arbitration, and because the plaintiffs underwent great expense in conducting
discovery. Id3X361.
In the present case, granting defendants motion to compel arbitration would clearly create
prejudice. Like the defendants in Chandler, defendants in this action have participated in
discovery far beyond that which would be allowed in arbitration. Also like Chandler, the
plaintiff in this action has expended substantial resources while participating in pretrial motions
and discovery. Because one of the major benefits of arbitration is to alleviate the costs which
have already been incurred here, it would be prejudicial to force plaintiffs to arbitrate after two
years of litigation. Finally, the two years of experience that defendants have had in this case,
including significant motion practice, has effectively allowed them to test the judicial waters.
Granting defendants' motion at this late stage would be no different than allowing them to forum
shop.
Because defendants have participated extensively in pretrial procedures and essentially
tested the judicial waters, and because plaintiff has expended great resources in over two years of
litigation, granting defendants' motion to compel arbitration would create prejudice.
CONCLUSION
After two years of litigation in this case, defendants request that the court grant a motion
to compel arbitration and stay this action. Although the original contract did have an arbitration
clause, defendants have waived their right to that arbitration. Waiver is proper in this case
because defendants showed no original intent to arbitrate their dispute with plaintiff. Also,
granting defendants motion to compel arbitration would create prejudice in this case due to the
extensive discovery, expenses, and testing of the judicial waters that has already occurred.
This signed Ruling shall be the ORDER of the court, denying defendants' Motion to
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Compel Arbitration and Stay litigation, and no further Order shall be required.
DATED this 25th day of June, 2004.
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David M. Wahlquist (#3349)
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Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore
limited liability company,
CASE SCHEDULING ORDER
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 020903521

vs.
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a
Utah corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

Judge Roger A. Livingston

Defendants.

Pursuant to the Attorney's Planning Meeting Report signed by counsel of record for the
parties and being otherwise advised in the premises, the Court hereby orders as follows:
1.

INITIAL DISCLOSURE: The parties have exchanged or will exchange by July
1, 2002 the information required by Rule 26(a)(1).

2.

DISCOVERY: The parties jointly propose to the court the following discovery
plan:
a.

All factual discovery will be completed no later than January 31, 2003.

b.

Reports under Rule 26(a)(2) from retained experts who will be called to
offer affirmative testimony will be submitted on February 28, 2003.

c.

Reports from rebuttal experts will be due on March 28, 2003. The
depositions of experts will be completed by April 30, 2003.

d.

The following discovery methods may be used:
x

Interrogatories (up to a maximum of 50)

x

Requests for Admission

x

Requests for Production of Documents

x

Oral Exam Deposition (up to a maximum of 15 for plaintiff and 15
for defendants, no deposition lasting longer than two days)

e.

Supplementation under Utah Civ.P. 26(e) are due as set forth in the
applicable rules.

3.

OTHER ITEMS:
a.

The cutoff date for joining additional parties is December 2, 2002.

b.

The cutoff date for amending pleadings is December 2, 2002. Specify
(NOTE: Establishing cutoff dates for amending pleadings does not relieve
counsel from the obligation to meet the requirement of Utah Civ.P. 15(a))

c.

The cutoff date for filing dispositive or potentially dispositive motions is
May 16,2003.

d.

Final lists of witnesses and exhibits pursuant to Utah Civ.P. 26(a)(3) are
due 30 days before trial.
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e.

The parties will have 10 days after service of final lists of witnesses and
exhibits to list objections under Rule 26(a)(3). *

Dated this \ p day of&use, 2002.
fHECO

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
KIRTON & McCONKIE
^MJJUI

(VUMU^JA

Jr

David M. Wahlquisi)
James E. Ellsworth
Attorneys for Plaintiff
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

W

gc

R. Stephen Marshall
David W. Tufts
Attorneys for Defendants
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ASIA PTE LTD

Et al,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

Case No: 020903521 DC

BRITESMILE INC Et al,
Defendant.

Judge:
Date:

Clerk:

ROGER A. LIVINGSTON
September 4, 2002

christef

PRESENT
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): JAMES E ELLSWORTH
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID W TUFTS
Video
Tape Number:
0 9 04 02
Tape Count: 1:32

HEARING
Defendant's motion to dismiss Count 6 denied, but court finds it
is an alternative to the contract claim. Defendant's motion to
dismiss Count 2 granted, but court gives leave of 3 0 days for
Plaintiff to file amended complaint
specifically setting forth with particularity those phrases
purported to be faudulent.
Dated this

day of

bs£

2

0 ^
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w

Di s t r j/qt^Court •" Judge /

Page 1 ( l a s t )
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David M. Wahlquist (#3349)
James E. Ellsworth (#5466)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
60 East South Temple, #1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore
limited liability company,
:
:

Plaintiff,

REVISED CASE SCHEDULING
ORDER

:

vs.

Civil No. 020903521
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a
Utah corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

:
:

Judge Roger A. Livingston

:

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) and the Stipulation and Motion for
Revised Scheduling Order filed by the parties, the Court hereby amends the existing case
schedule only as follows:
1.

DISCOVERY:
a.

All factual discovery will be completed no later than May 30, 2003.

b.

Reports under Rule 26(a)(2) from retained experts who will be called to
offer affirmative testimony will be submitted on June 30, 2003.

c.

Reports from rebuttal experts will be due on July 31, 2003. The
depositions of experts will be completed by August 29. 2003.

OTHER ITEMS:
a.

The cutoff date for filing dispositive or potentially dispositive motions is
September 16, 2003.

Dated this / f 'day of Jap^ry, 2003.
BY THE COURT
J

±
Honorable Roger jClivjngston
7%J>Cg>^

District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
KJRTON & McCONKIE

Wahlquist
/ames E. Ellsworth
Attorneys for Plaintiff
DURHAM JOKES & PINEGAR

R. StephenlMar^hall
David W. Tufts
Attorneys for Defendants
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SMILE INC,
MINUTE ENTRY

Plaintiff,
vs,

Case No: 020903521 .

BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT INC,
Defendant.

Judge: ROBERT K HILDER
Date: 06/02/2003

Clerk: rhilder
Plaintiff has submitted its Motion to Compel for decision. The
court has reviewed the file and finds no response from defendants,
but in plaintiffs' affidavit in support of request for attorney's
fees, the court notes an entry dated April 22, 2003, for 1.9 hours,
which includes "Follow up re: Defendants' response to Plaintiff's
Motion to Compel," and several references to communication with
counsel for defendants on this same topic. In light of the
apparent continuiing communication between counsel, the court is
unwilling to sign plaintiff's proposed Order at this time, but will
consider doing so when counsel and the court^^p&^n June 11, 2 0 03,
to consider the pending Motion to Dismiss.

r S ^ ^ ^

)S^RX..^''HILDER
' V ^ / ^ ' S T H I C ^

Page 1 (last)
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Deputy Clerk

David M. Waalquist (#3349)
James E. Ellsworth (#5466)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
60 East South Temple, #1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 32S-3600
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT EM AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SM fUE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore
limited liability company,

SECOND REVISED CASE
SCHEDULING ORDER

Plaintiff.
vs.

Civil No. 020903521

BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a
Utah corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

Judse Roger A. Livineston

JAiUl

Defendants.

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) and the Stipulation and Motion for Second
Revised Scheduling Order filed by the parties, the Court hereby amends the cxistmg case
schedule only as follows:
1.

DISCOVERY:
a.

All factual discovery will be completed no later than September 30, 2003.

b.

Reports under Ride 26(a)(2) from retained experts who will be called to
offer affirmative testimony will be submitted on October 31, 2003.

ID

c.

Reports from rebuttal experts will be due on November 28, 2003. The
depositions of experts will be completed by December 31, 2003.

2. OTHER ITEMS:
a.

The cutoff date for filing dispositive or potentially dispositive motions wil
be January 16,2004.

Dated this J

'"day of

/K&^

, 2 003.
BY THE

Hon6r\
District
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
KIRTON &

Dsfvid M. Wahlquist
a ames E. Ellsworth
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

fe£l

RV Stephen MarlHaJl
David W. Tuf
Erik A. Olson
Attorneys for Defendants
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FILED DISTRICT SOSIRT
Third •Jii'c'icis! District

JUL 2 l,m
David M. Wahlquist (#3349)
James E. Ellsworth (#5466)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
1800 Eagle Gate Tower
60 East South Temple
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

SALT LAKE vC-

ByDeputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD.
Plaintiff,

ORDER RE: AWARD OF EXPENSES
FOR MOTION TO COMPEL

vs.
Civil No. 020903521
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., et al,
Judge Robert Hilder
Defendants.

Pursuant to the June 11, 2003 hearing on Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and For Sanctions,
arguments of counsel, the Court's ruling thereon, Affidavit of Attorneys Fees, Supplemental
Affidavit of Attorneys Fees, other submissions of the parties, and good cause appearing,
THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS Defendants to pay to Plaintiff within trn (10) days of tho
fhtp, of this Q H W thft amount of $ / 3 JO .
Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and Fgr Sanctions.

as expenses awarded to Plaintiff pursuant to

IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED this

_, 2003.

-day of
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T
BY THE

Htffiorabie Robert
District Court Judgi

o-\<?

KIRTON & McCONKIE
David M. Wahlquist (3349)
James E. Ellsworth (5466)
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Attorneys for plaintiff

"^SSftg-r

DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
R. Stephen Marshall (2097)
David W. Tufts (8736)
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)415-3000
Attorneys for defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore

STIPULATION GOVERNING THE
DISCLOSURE OF CONFIDENTIAL AND
PROPRIETARY INFORMATION AND
[m&$%m&\ ORDER THEREON

Plaintiff,

BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah
corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Defendants.

Case No. 020903521
Judge Hilder

BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Counterclaim Plaintiff,

SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore
limited liability company,
Counterclaim Defendants.

1

Plaintiff and Defendants hereby stipulate and agree that the following provisions shall
govern the disclosure of confidential and proprietary information in this action:
1.

As used herein, "Restricted Information" shall mean information which is not

otherwise available to the public and which, in the reasonable and good faith belief of the
designating party, discloses a trade secret or other confidential research, development,
manufacturing, financial or commercial information, including licensing information, of the
designating party, which justice requires be protected from disclosure. "Designating Party"
means the party who designates documents, discovery responses or testimony as Restricted
Information under this Stipulation and Order.
2.

Any party may designate documents and discovery responses it produced in this

case as Restricted Information by stamping it "Restricted Information" as provided in paragraph
10 herein. All copies, summaries or descriptions of the Restricted Information shall be treated as
Restricted Information which is subject to this Stipulation and Order.
3.

Except as otherwise may be provided by this Stipulation and Order, or by further

order of the Court, access to Restricted Information shall be limited to: (a) the Court and its
officers; (b) designated witnesses (as provided in paragraph 8 herein), court reporters at
depositions, hearings or other proceedings in this action; (c) attorneys of record in this action,
including the secretarial, legal assistants and office staffs of such attorneys; (d) persons engaged
by attorneys of record in this action to assist them in the preparation of this action, including
independent experts and consultants and their employees; and (e) the parties to this action, their
officers, directors and employees, and persons engaged by the parties to assist them in the
preparation of this action, including independent experts and consultants and their employees
(collectively, the "Approved Persons"). Approved Persons having access to Restricted

Information shall not disclose such information to any person not bound by this Stipulation and
Order.
4.

In the event that a Designating Party, in the reasonable and good faith belief that

justice requires it, deems it necessary to deny access to specified Restricted Information to those
persons described above in paragraph 3(e), such information may be designated "Restricted
Information/Attorneys' Eyes Only." Where information is designated "Restricted
Information/Attorneys' Eyes Only," the attorneys of record for the parties shall deny such
information to those persons described above in paragraph 3(e), unless the Designating Party
discloses the information to those persons at depositions, hearings or other proceedings in this
action. The Designating Party is the only party authorized to disclose information designated
"Restricted Information/Attorneys' Eyes Only" to the persons described in paragraph 3(e).
5.

Hereafter, the term "Restricted Information" shall include and refer to both

information designated as "Restricted Information" and information designated as "Restricted
Information/Attorneys' Eyes Only."
6.

A party's designation of documents, testimony, or other information as Restricted

Information and/or a party's objection to disclosure of designated Restricted Information is not
absolute but may be challenged and determined by the Court.
7.

Restricted Information shall be used and disclosed by the parties to this litigation,

and/or by any person granted access thereto under this Stipulation and Order, only for the
preparation and trial of this action. No party and no person granted access under this Stipulation
and Order shall disclose Restricted Information, or any information therefrom, except as
provided in this Stipulation and Order. Notwithstanding the foregoing, this Stipulation and
Order does not restrict the right of the Designating Party to make such use or disclosure of its
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own documents or material which have been designated as Restricted Information as it otherwise
is entitled to make.
8.

Any person described in paragraphs 3(b), 3(d) and 3(e) herein, having access to

Restricted Information shall be informed of this Stipulation and Order and shall agree in writing
to be bound by the terms of this Stipulation and Order by executing a copy of Exhibit A (which
shall be maintained by the attorneys of record in this action) prior to being shown Restricted
Information. Counsel for the parties to this Stipulation and Order shall each maintain a list of the
Approved Person(s) who provide to counsel an executed copy of Exhibit A.
9.

Any party seeking to disclose Restricted Information to any witness at a

deposition, hearing or other proceeding in this action, shall inform the party who made the
designation at least five (5) court days prior to making such disclosure and no disclosure shall be
made if the party who made the designation objects thereto. If there is no objection, the witness
shall agree in writing to be bound by the terms of this Stipulation and Order by executing a copy
of Exhibit A (which shall be maintained by the attorneys of record for the party seeking to reveal
the Restricted Information to the witness) in advance of being shown the Restricted Information.
The parties or their respective counsel shall request all witnesses to whom they seek to show
Restricted Information to execute a copy of Exhibit A. Neither the parties nor their counsel shall
discourage any witness from signing a copy of Exhibit A. If a party objects to disclosure of
Restricted Information to a witness who has signed Exhibit A, Restricted Information may not be
disclosed to such witness unless ordered by the Court upon a motion. Upon the sending of a
written objection, the parties shall meet and confer in good faith regarding such objection. If the
parties cannot agree and a motion is filed to allow disclosure of Restricted Information to a
witness, the party objecting to disclosure to the witness (who signed Exhibit A) shall bear the
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burden of proving that the witness should not be allowed to receive Restricted Information.
10.

An Approved Person may disclose Restricted Information in response to a

subpoena or order of a court or other governmental entity, but not prior to the return date or date
of production specified in the subpoena or order. The Approved Person shall give written notice
of such subpoena or order within five calendar (5) days of receipt thereof to the Designating
Party. Such Approved Person may produce Restricted Information in compliance with the
subpoena or order unless the Approved Person has been given timely advance notice that an
order quashing or limiting the subpoena or staying or limiting the order of disclosure has been
entered or that a motion for such an order has been filed.
11.

In the production of documents or responses to discovery by any party hereto,

Restricted Information shall be designated by marking each document in which such Restricted
Information is contained. Such marking shall be made prior to the transmission of a physical
copy of such document to the party requesting such document, and shall be in substantially the
following form:
"RESTRICTED INFORMATION
SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER
Civil No. 020903521"
or
"RESTRICTED INFORMATION/ATTORNEYS' EYES ONLY
SUBJECT TO PROTECTIVE ORDER
Civil No. 020903521"

The foregoing designation shall be applied to the document.
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12.

In connection with the taking of any deposition in this action:
a.

Counsel for any party hereto may, prior to or at the commencement of any

such deposition, temporarily designate the entire deposition transcript as Restricted Information.
In that event, the Designating Party shall give a copy of this Stipulation and Order to the court
reporter reporting the deposition and shall request that such reporter execute a copy of Exhibit A,
which shall constitute an agreement that he or she, his or her employees, and his or her agents
shall be bound by the terms of this Stipulation and Order, and shall make no use or disclosure of
Restricted Information unless expressly permitted by the terms of this Stipulation and Order, or
by the express consent of the Designating Party. Such acknowledgment thereafter shall remain
in effect for any subsequent depositions reported by such reporter.
b.

When any party has designated temporarily the entire deposition transcript

as Restricted Information, the designation will be deemed withdrawn unless the Designating
Party, within twenty-five (25) days after receipt of the transcript, marks as Restricted Information
those specific pages of the transcript constituting Restricted Information, thus rescinding the
Restricted Information designation of all remaining pages, and notifies all other parties hereto
and the reporter in writing which pages are deemed to constitute Restricted Information.
13.

All Restricted Information filed with the Court shall be filed or lodged in securely

sealed envelopes or other appropriately sealed containers, on which shall be endorsed:
a.

the title of this action;

b.

an indication of the nature of the contents;

c.

the words "RESTRICTED INFORMATION"; and

d.

a statement substantially in the following form: "Subject to Protective

Order. Not to be Opened or the Contents Revealed Except (1) to the Court and Then Resealed,
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(2) by Written Agreement of the Parties, or (3) by Order of This Court."
14.

Any party to this action may at any time notify the other parties hereto in writing

of its objection that a portion or all of the information previously designated as Restricted
Information is not entitled to such protection under the terms of this Stipulation and Order. Upon
the sending of such'written notice, the parties shall meet and confer in good faith regarding such
designation. The parties can agree during the meet and confer process, or at any other time, to
partially de-designate information so it may be disclosed to persons other than Approved
Persons. If the parties cannot agree, the party challenging the designation shall be the moving
party of record if any motion is filed to de-designate the information. The designating party shall
bear the burden in such motion of proving that the information was properly designated.
15.

All Restricted Information produced pursuant to this Stipulation and Order shall

be maintained with all reasonable measures being taken by the party with custody of such
Restricted Information to ensure the confidentiality of such information in accordance with the
terms of this Stipulation and Order.
16.

If a party to this Stipulation and Order (or its counsel) becomes aware that it has

disclosed Restricted Information to other than an Approved Person, such party (or its counsel)
shall immediately inform counsel for the party whose Restricted Information has thus been
disclosed of all relevant information concerning the nature and circumstances of such disclosure,
and such party shall promptly take all reasonable measures to prevent further or greater
unauthorized disclosure of the Restricted Information.
17.

If a party discovers that it inadvertently has produced information which is not

designated as Restricted Information but which it intended to have so designated, and such
failure to designate was the result of mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect, the party may
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make such designation after the fact so long as it does so within a reasonable time after the
disclosure.
18.

If information subject to a claim of attorney-client privilege or attorney work

product is nevertheless inadvertently disclosed to another party, such disclosure shall in no way
prejudice or otherwise constitute a waiver of, or estoppel as to, any claim of attorney-client
privilege or attorney work product to which the disclosing party or other person would otherwise
be entitled. If a claim of inadvertent disclosure is made, pursuant to this paragraph, with respect
to information then in the custody of another party, such party shall promptly return to the
claiming party or person that material as to which the claim of inadvertent disclosure has been
made. The party returning such material then may move the Court for an order compelling
production of the material.
19.

Upon final termination of this action, counsel for each party shall inform opposing

counsel as to the desired disposition of Restricted Information in the possession of the other party
(and/or its counsel). The Restricted Information, except for that incorporated in the work product
of counsel for parties to this action, shall either be assembled and returned to the Designating
Party or destroyed, according to the desires of the Designating Party, within sixty (60) calendar
days of the final termination of this action. Notwithstanding, counsel may retain a copy of the
Restricted Information in its file.
20.

The Designating Party may request that the clerk of the Court return to the party

that filed them all documents that have been filed or lodged with the Court and have been sealed
as confidential pursuant to this Stipulation and Order. If such documents cannot be returned by
the clerk, the Designating Party may request that the clerk maintain in perpetuity, under seal, all
papers filed under seal with the Court.
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21.

This Stipulation and Order shall be without prejudice to the right of any party to

challenge the propriety of discovery on other grounds, and nothing contained herein shall be
construed as a waiver of any applicable privilege, nor of any objection that might be raised as to
the admissibility at trial of any evidentiary material. The parties reserve all rights to apply to the
Court for an ordei modifying this Stipulation and Order or seeking further protection on this or
other issues, and this Stipulation and Order shall not be construed to preclude a party from
applying for or obtaining such further protection.
22.

Except as specifically provided herein, the terms, conditions and limitations of

this Stipulation and Order shall survive the termination of this action, and the Court shall retain
jurisdiction with respect to this Stipulation and Order following termination of this action.
23.

No part of the terms, conditions or limitations imposed by this Stipulation and

Order may be modified or terminated except by (a) written stipulation executed by counsel of
record for each party hereto and/or (b) order of the Court.
IT IS SO STIPULATED:
DATE: July J^_, 2003

DtJRHAM

fd^^TfJNEGAR

R. Stephen Marshall
David W. Tufts
Attorneys for Defendants

DATE: July / / ,2003

KiRTON & McCONKIE
^/David M. Wahlquist
James E. Ellsworth
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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ORDER
The Court having reviewed the foregoing Stipulation and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that such Stipulation shall be and is the Ord.et.of this Court.

s^k&tCsS
DATED:

<M.
#.

/

i± <zz>l>x? S

Judge Hilcfe\ % ^ " ^ ^ f
District C o u r i ^ g & r ; ^
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David M. Wahlquist (#3349)
James E. Ellsworth (#5466)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
60 East South Temple, #1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore
limited liability company,
:
:

CASE SCHEDULING ORDER

vs.

:

Civil No. 020903521

BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a
Utah corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

:
:
:

Judge Robert Hilder

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

:

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) and the Joint Motionfor Revised
Scheduling Order filed by the parties, the Court hereby amends the existing case schedule only
as follows:
1.

DISCOVERY:
a.

All factual discovery will be completed no later than January 30, 2004.

b.

Reports under Rule 26(a)(2) from retained experts who will be called to
offer affirmative testimony will be submitted on February 27, 2004.

2y

c.

Reports from rebuttal experts will be due on March 31, 2004. The
depositions of experts will be completed by April 30, 2004.

2. OTHER ITEMS:
a.

The cutoff date for filing dispositive or potentially dispositive motions will
be May 28, 2004.

Dated this / /

i^L

dayo

_, 2003.

(/

BY THE COURT

Horto/atfte Ro'
District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
KTRTON

/David M. Wahlquist
James E. Ellsworth
Attorneys for Plaintiff
DURHAM JONES & PTNEGAR

FCTStephen M^rs^all
David W. Tufts
Erik A. Olson
Attorneys for Defendants
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David M. Wahlquist (#3349)
James E. Ellsworth (#5466)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
60 East South Temple, #1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD.
:
:

ORDER OF THE COURT

vs.

:

Civil No. 020903521

BmESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., era/,

:

Judge Hilda:

Plaintiff,

Defendants.

:

The above-captioned matter came before the Court on (1) Defendants' Second Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiffs cause of action for fraudulent inducement as well as on (2) Plaintiffs Motion to
Compel and For Sanctions. Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss was fully briefed by Defendants
and by Plaintiff. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel and For Sanctions was unopposed by any written
submissions of Defendants but was disputed at oral argument.
Based upon the briefing and oral arguments of counsel, applicable rules and case law, and
for good cause appearing, THE COURT ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

Defendants' Second Motion to Dismiss is denied. Plaintiffs allegations meet the

minimum pleading threshold.
2. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is granted to the following extent:
a. Defendants are to make documents responsive to Plaintiffs pending Requests for
Production of Documents immediately available to Plaintiff for inspection and copying.
Defendants should also provide Plaintiff with a written response to the Requests for
Production of Documents no later than June 25, 2003.
b. Defendants are to provide to Plaintiff appropriate responses to Plaintiff s pending
Interrogatories no later than June 25, 2003.
c. Plaintiff is entitled to and hereby granted an award of expenses relative to its
Motion to Compel and For Sanctions in an amount to be determined by the Court. Plaintiff
is to provide a supplemental affidavit of expenses to the Court within ten days. Within ten
days of Plaintiffs submission of a supplemental affidavit of expenses, Defendants may
submit an opposition to the Court setting forth any contest as to the amount of expenses
asserted by Plaintiff (but not disputing the underlying entitlement of Plaintiff to an award of
expenses).
d. Defendants initial answers to Plaintiffs Requests for Admission numbers 1,2,11,
12, 13, 16, 18, 19, 28, and 29 were denials by Defendants and timely made. Defendant's
proposed Amended Answers to Plaintiffs Requests for Admission are allowed and deemed
amended only insofar as those proposed Amended Answers are admissions by Defendants.

2

3. The current case schedule of this matter will need to be redone to accommodate for the
delays in complying with the outstanding discovery requests and in addressing Plaintiffs Motion
to Compel and For Sanctions. The parties will work together to submit a revised case schedule to
the Court.
IT IS SO'ORDERED.

DATED thi f^avof

^u2—*

,2003.

BYTHECQLJRT

Honorab
District Ju<
Approved as to form:
DURHAM JONES & PINEG
J6 Stepheri Mkrshair
David W. Tuft:
Attorneys for Defendants
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David M. Wahlquist (#3349)
James E. Ellsworth (#5466)
KIRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
60 East South Temple, #1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801)328-3600

SALT LAKE. COUNTY
Sy-t-u......*—.
Deputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SECOND ORDER OF THE COURT
REGARDING DEFENDANTS'
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS

SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 020903521
BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah
corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC., a Utah
corporation,

Judge Robert Hilder

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court via an unscheduled telephone conference requested by
James E. Ellsworth, attorney for the Plaintiff, on Friday, July 12, 2003. On June 11, 2003, the
Court issued an order which provided, in part, as follows:
2(a) Defendants are to make documents responsive to Plaintiffs
pending Requests for Production of documents immediately
available to Plaintiff for inspection and copying. Defendants
should also provide Plaintiff with a written response to the
Requests for Production of Documents no later than June 25, 2003.

l

On June 18, 2003, Defendants produced over 5,000 pages of documents to Plaintiff at the
offices of Defendants' counsel. On June 24, 2003, Defendants hand-delivered a copy of
Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs First Set of Requests for Production of Document to
Plaintiffs counsel. In Defendants' written responses, Defendants state that they will provide
documents responsive to Plaintiffs discovery requests no. 11, 12, 14 and 15 at Defendants'
facility in Walnut Creek, California, as those documents are maintained in their ordinary course.
Specifically, Defendants stated that they have already produced documents in response to
requests no. 11 and 12 at the meeting held on June 18, 2003, and that they would produce the
remaining documents responsive to requests no. 11 and 12, as well as all documents responsive
to requests no. 14 and 15 cuirently in Defendants' possession, custody or control at Defendants'
facility in Walnut Creek, California. Defendants have further represented to Plaintiff and to the
Court that Defendants are currently in the process of moving their warehouse of documents to a
different warehouse, and this move will take four to five weeks, and that because of this move
Defendants are physically unable to make the documents responsive to the above-referenced
requests available for Plaintiffs inspection until August 15, 2003, at the earliest. Based on these
representations of Defendants' counsel to the Court, the Court orders as follows:
1.

Defendants shall produce all documents responsive to Plaintiffs Requests for

Production of Documents Nos. 11, 12, 14, and 15 that have not already been produced at
Defendants' Walnut Creek California facility commencing on August 18, 2003 and continuing
thereafter until Plaintiffs have had a reasonable opportunity to complete their inspection and/or
copying.
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2.

In the event that the Plaintiff discovers evidence that the above-stated

representations made by Defendants to the Court relative to Defendants' warehouse move and/or
Defendants' inability to immediately produce the above-referenced documents are not accurate,
Plaintiff may submit a motion to the Court seeking an appropriate sanction against Defendants.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

A

Dated this 7 "day of 1 ^ 2 0 0 3 .
BY THE OQU^':^.;'.;•:;.\
•J

Honorable Rob'e^Hilder
District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Durham Jones & Pinegar

Attorneys for Defendants
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Third Judicial Distort

KIRTON & McCONKIE
David M. Wahlquist (3349)
James E. Ellsworth (5466)
60 East South Temple, Suite 1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Attorneys for Plaintiff

FES 0*i -20M I
SALT LAKE COUNTY VA
By —

——*—'

^Deputy Clerk

DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR, P.C.
R. Stephen Marshall (2097)
David W. Tufts (8736)
111 E. Broadway, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)415-3000
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore
limited liability company,

ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFF'S
PRODUCTION OF CERTAIN PATIENT
RECORDS

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 020903521

BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah
corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Defendants.

Judge Hilder

BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a Utah
corporation,
Counterclaim Plaintiff,

j

vs.
SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore
limited liability company,
Counterclaim Defendants.

_

_[

37

Having reviewed the submission of the Plaintiff and Defendants relative to Plaintiffs
patient records, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby orders as follows:
Plaintiff is directed to produce to counsel for Defendants the Plaintiffs patient records
identified as document numbers SMILE2001 -SMILE3063. This production of Plaintiff s
patient records is to be within the confines of the existing Order of the Court regarding
confidentially.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

is d^_ day ^^MJ^^My
DATED this

, 2004.

(J
BY THE COURT

Jti&gjS riild

Stipulated as to the form of this Order.
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

KIRTON &McCONKIE

R.L Stephen Mar
Mar3haIT"
David W. Tufts '
Attorneys for Defendants

jXvid M. Wahlquist
^James E. Ellsworth
Attorneys for Plaintiff
#726576.1
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David M. Wahlquist (#3349)
James E. Ellsworth (#5466)
K1RTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
60 East South Temple, #1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0 320
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

SALT LAKE COUNTY <

By=
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore
limited liability company,
CASE SCHEDULING ORDER
Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 020903521

BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a
Utah corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC.
a Utah corporation,

Judge Robert Hilder

Defendants.

Pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f) and the Joint Motion for Further Revised
Scheduling Order filed by the parties, the Court hereby amends the existing case schedule only
as follows:
1.

DISCOVERY:
a.

All factual discovery will be completed no later than August 31, 2004.

b.

Reports under Rule 26(a)(2) from retained experts who will be called to
offer affirmative testimony will be submitted on September 30, 2004.
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c.

Reports from rebuttal experts will be due on November 305 2004. The
depositions of experts will be completed by December 31, 2004.

2. OTHER ITEMS:
a.

The cutoff date for filing dispositive or potentially dispositive motions will
be January 31, 2005.

Dated this

f* day of/^^<C

m9

2004.

BY THE COURT

Ffoiforable Robert M l d ^ » . . ^
District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
KIRTON & McCONKIE

/David M. Wahlquist
f James E. Ellsworth
Attorneys for Plaintiff

DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

R. Stephen"Mai^hall
David W. Tufts
Erik A. Olson
Attorneys for Defendants

?

i i t i l BISTRiCT COURT
Third Judicial District

AUTO 1 1 ^
SALT LAKF COUNT

By.
David M. Wahlquist (#3349)
James E. Ellsworth (#5466)
KRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
60 East South Temple, #1800
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER OF THE COURT
REGARDING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER
AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO
COMPEL

BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a
Utah corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC.,
a Utah corporation,

Civil No. 020903521
Judge Robert Hilder

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on (1) Defendants' Motion for Protective Order and
(2) Plaintiffs Motion to Compel. These motions were fully briefed by Defendants and by
Plaintiff. The Court heard oral argument on these motions on June 14, 2004.
Based upon the briefing and oral arguments of counsel, applicable rules and case law, and
for good cause appearing, THE COURT ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1. Defendants' Motion for Protective Order is denied.

l ~ ^ " \

2. Plaintiffs Motion to Compel is granted as follows:
a. Based on the stipulation of the Defendants, the Court hereby orders that all
documents which have been produced by either of the Defendants to Plaintiff in this
litigation are true, correct, and authentic copies kept by Defendants in the ordinary course
of their business.
b. Defendants are to produce to Plaintiff by July 14, 2004, all e-mail documents
for a five year period from 1996 through 2001 that are responsive to the categories
addressed in Plaintiffs pending requests for production of Documents. Defendants shall
provide a log identifying all responsive documents to which a privilege is claimed.
c. Plaintiff is entitled to receive an electronic copy of Defendants' accounting
data documents and/or operating software if it is technically feasible to provide such a
copy. On or before July 4, 2004, Plaintiff and Defendants are to have their respective
technical personnel confer, with or without counsel, via telephone or in person, to
determine whether the electronic documents and/or applicable software of Defendants
used to access that data can be copied for use by Plaintiff solely for purposes of this
litigation. To whatever extent Defendants documents maintained electronically and/or
software relative thereto can be copied, those documents and software should be
promptly copied and provided to Plaintiff. If any portion of Defendants electronic
documents cannot be copied for delivery to Plaintiff, then Plaintiff and/or Defendants
may request a further hearing before the Court to address these document production
issues. If Defendants' are precluded by a software license or some other technical
restriction from copying the software for use by Plaintiff solely in connection with this
litigation, then Plaintiff and/or Defendant may request a further hearing before the Court
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to address this issue. The Court expressly finds that Plaintiff is not limited to giving
queries to Defendants to have Defendants run those queries on Defendants' computer
system and provide Plaintiff with responsive print outs.
d. The Court expects both parties to cooperate in good faith. Should issues arise
concerning compliance with this Order or some other related issue, the Court invites the
parties to raise those issues with the Court so that the Court can rule upon them.
e. The Court reserves the issue of an award of costs and attorney fees relative to
these motions until the Court has been able to explore the true degree of difficulty for
Defendants to produce the electronic documents.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this ^ V d a y o f L ^ V

, 2004.
BY THE-COURT

/A*
^onoiable RoberrTIiidefe;£5P y
District Judge

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DURHAM JONES & PINEGAR

David W. Tufts
Attorneys for Defendants
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Third Judicial District
David M. Wahlquist (#3349)
James E. Ellsworth (#5466)
KJRTON & McCONKIE
Attorneys for Plaintiff
P.O. Box 45120
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0120
Telephone: (801) 328-3600

AUG 1 1 2004

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

SMILE INC. ASIA PTE. LTD., a Singapore
limited liability company,
Plaintiff,

:
:

vs.

:

BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT, INC., a
Utah corporation; and BRITESMILE, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

:
:
:
:

JULY 13,2004 ORDER
OF THE COURT

Civil No. 020903521
Judge Robert Hilder

This matter came before the Court on July 13, 2004, pursuant to Defendants' Report and
Request for Further Court Intervention Concerning Production of Electronic Data. Mr. Steve
Gordon and Mr. Chad Pomeroy appeared on behalf of Defendants. Mr. James Ellsworth
appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff.
Based upon the arguments of counsel, applicable rules and case law, and for good cause
appearing, the Court ordered the following in furtherance of the Court's prior rulings relative to
Defendants' Motion for Protective Order and Plaintiffs Motion to Compel:
1. Defendants are to produce to Plaintiff in a readable form (in either electronic or hard
copy), no later than August 31, 2004, all e-mails through December 31, 2001, that are responsive

to the categories addressed in all Plaintiffs requests for production of Documents. The cost of
this production is to be borne by Defendants.
2. Defendants are to produce to Plaintiff an electronic copy of Defendants' accounting
data documents by July 21, 2004, if possible, but no later than by July 31, 2004. Defendants are
to produce those data documents to Plaintiff in SQL format. Defendants have represented that
this copying of electronic accounting data documents as ordered is not difficult or expensive.
The reasonable cost of copying Defendants5 accounting data documents is to be borne by
Plaintiff.
3. The Court understands that there may still be issues outstanding of accessibility of the
electronic accounting data being produced by Defendants and accessing software relative thereto.
Accordingly, after the referenced production has been made, the Court will seek to make itself
available as necessary upon the subsequent request of Plaintiff or Defendants to address issues of
accessing softwzire or other items relative to this document production.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this fe ' day o £ i ^ ^ ^ ^ 0 0 4 .
BYTHEXOURT

honorable Robert Hilderi
District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:
DURHAM JONES cSrpINEGAR

David W
Chad Pomeroy
Attorneys for Defendants
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SMILE INC,
Plaintiff,

MINUTE ENTRY AND ORDER

vs.

Case No: 020903521

BRITESMILE MANAGEMENT INC,
Defendant.

Judge: ROBERT K HILDER
Date: 09/02/2004

Clerk: rhilder
Defendants' Motion to Determine Jurisdiction has been submitted to
the court for decision. The parties have requested argument, but
because the court has determined that its ability to address the
issue is extremely limited, argument will only delay the process
and the court now enters the following ORDER staying further
proceedings in the trial court pending possible direction from the
Utah Court of Appeals. The reason for this court's action is as
follows: The court finds that there is substantial ambiguity in
the status of defendants' appeal of the court's Order denying
arbitration, and that this court lacks both the jurisdiction and
the ability to resolve that ambiguity. That is, when this court
denied the Motion to Compel Arbitration, defendants appealed.
Because the Order does not dispose of all issues, and because no
Rule 54(b) certification was sought or granted, and based on prior
experience in the Central Florida case, 40 P.3d 599 (Ut. 2002),
this court assumed that the appeal would, in fact, be a petition
for interlocutory appeal. The court only learned today that
defendants' appeal was taken pursuant to UCA 78 -31a-129, which
appears to provide an appeal as of right. In the Central Florida
case, this court denied a stay, but after the Utah Supreme Court
granted leave to proceed with the appeal, that Court also stayed
proceedings in the trial court. Thus, it seems to this court, that
if the appeal is of right, and it appears to be following the usual
apppellate track, rather than the interlocutory appeal route, then
this court must stay proceedings. It is possible that the cited
statute was not meant to provide such a result when the judgment is
not final, but this court does not believe it has the jurisdiction
to address that issue. Accordingly, the court grants the stay as
indicated. Any further consideration of the issue must occur at
the Court of Appeals, unless and until the matter is remanded to
this court. This signed Minute Entry shall be the ORDER of the
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court and no further Order is required.
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JUDICIAL CODE
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration
and Award § 84.

C.J.S. — 6 C.J.S. Arbitration § 58.

78-3la-3. Arbitration agreement [Repealed effective May
15, 2003].
A written agreement to submit any existing or future controversy to
arbitration is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon grounds existing
at law or equity to set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as
provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
History: C. 1953, 78-31a-3, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 225, § 1.
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws
2002, ch. 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and
enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective
May 15, 2003.
Cross-References. — Labor Commission to
promote voluntary arbitration of labor disputes, § 34A-M03.

Partnership, single partner may not submit
to arbitration, § 48-1-6.
Policy that work terms and conditions should
result from voluntary agreement, § 34-20-1.
Public transit district labor disputes, § 17A2-1032.
Water disputes, informal arbitration by state
engineer, § 73-2-16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Unconscionability.

ANALYSIS

Municipal corporations.
Oral modification.
Prerequisites.
Unconscionability.
—Procedural.
—Substantive.
Waiver.
Cited.

—Procedural.
Where patient was given the physician-patient arbitration agreement to sign just minutes before her surgery without any opportunity to discuss the terms of the agreement or
the option of not signing it, the elements of
procedural unconscionability surrounded the
negotiation of this agreement. Sosa v. Paulos,
924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996).

Municipal corporations.
Absent a statutory prohibition, a municipal
corporation has the power to submit to arbitration any claim asserted by or against it. Lindon
City v. Engineers Constr. Co., 636 P.2d 1070
(Utah 1981).

— Substantive.
The term in a physician-patient arbitration
agreement, requiring the arbitration panel to
be comprised of neutrally selected orthopedic
surgeons, is not, when standing alone, "so onesided as to oppress or unfairly surprise an
innocent party" and constitute susbstantive unconscionability. Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357
(Utah 1996).
The term in a physician-patient arbitration
agreement, requiring payment of costs by a
patient who wins less than half the amount of
damages sought in arbitration, is substantively
unconscionable on its face, considering that
under this term, the patient must pay the
doctor's attorney's fees and costs, even in situations where the physician is determined to
have committed malpractice. Sosa v. Paulos,
924 P.2d 357 (Utah 1996).

Oral modification.
Because standard principles of contract construction allow parties to agree to modify a
wntten contract by their conduct or oral agreement, an unwritten agreement to modify the
jurisdiction of an arbitrator was enforceable.
Pacific Dev., L.C. v. Orton, 1999 UT App 217,
982 P.2d 94.
Prerequisites.
Because this section provides that only a
written agreement to submit a claim to arbitration is valid and enforceable, an arbitration
agreement must be written to be enforceable
under § 78-3 la-4. Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d
796 (Utah 1998).

Waiver.
Waiver of a contractual right of arbitration
must be based on both a finding of participation
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in litigation to a point inconsistent with the
intent to arbitrate and a finding of prejudice;
both prongs of this test turn on the facts of the
individual case and, furthermore, consistent
with policy considerations, any real detriment
is sufficient to support a finding of prejudice.

78-31a,4

Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 R2d
356 (Utah 1992).
Cited in Allred v. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n,
909 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1996).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration
and Award §§ 11 to 53.
C.J.S. — 6 C.J.S. Arbitration §§ 7 to 57.
A.L.R. —Attorney's submission of dispute to
arbitration, or amendment of arbitration agreement, without client's knowledge or consent, 48
A.L.R.4th 127.

Participation in arbitration proceedings as
waiver to objections to arbitrabiHty under state
law, 56 A.L.R.5th 757.
Awarding attorneys' fees in connection with
arbitration, 60 A.L.R.5th 669.

78-3la-4. Court o r d e r to a r b i t r a t e [Repealed effective
May 15, 2003].
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is raised
concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the
matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those issues and
order or deny arbitration accordingly.
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration agreement
is involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court having jurisdiction to hear motions to compel arbitration,, the motion shall be made to that
court. Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a court with proper venue.
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action or
proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement.
However, if the issue is severable from the other issues in the action or
proceeding, only the issue subject to arbitration is stayed. If a motion is made
in an action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include a stay of the
action or proceeding.
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded on a claim
that an issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for the
claim have not been shown.
History: C. 1953, 78-31a-4, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 225, § 1.
Repealed effective May 15, 2003. — Laws

2002, ch. 326, § 33 repeals this chapter and
enacts a new Chapter 31a in its place, effective
May 15, 2003.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Arbitration agreement.
Notice.
Arbitration agreement.
A provision in a professional agreement between employees and a school district creating
a grievance procedure by which an employee
could seek review of the employer's actions
within the chain of command, ultimately reaching the elected board of directors of the district,

was not an agreement to submit a dispute to
arbitration. Reed v. Davis County Sch. Dist.,
892 P.2d 1063 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
Because § 78-31a-3 provides that only a
written agreement to submit a claim to arbitration is valid and enforceable, an arbitration
agreement must be written to be enforceable
under this section. Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d
796 (Utah 1998).
Because parties to binding arbitration waive
substantial rights to formal public adjudication
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78-31a-130

JUDICIAL CODE
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Apphcability.
Vacation without directing rearbitration.

whether the order is a final judgment or has
otherwise been designated as final by the dis&& c o u r t ^ ^ {J.R.C.P. 54(b). Pledger v.
Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, 982 P.2d 572.

Applicability.
Former section was procedural and would
therefore apply to an action in which the complaint was filed before the effective date of the
section but the appeal was filed after such date.
Docutel Olivetti Corp. v Dick Brady Sys., 731
P.2d 475 (Utah 1986).
A party may seek review of any order denying
a motion to compel arbitration, regardless of

Vacation without directing rearbitration.
Order of court in arbitration case, setting
aside award and ordering new hearing without
order for resubmission but also affirmatively
ordering plaintiffs and interveners to present
their claims for damages to receiver of defendant corporation, was final and appealable order. Bivans v. Utah Lake Land, Water & Power
Co., 53 Utah 601, 174 P. 1126 (1918).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 5 Am. Jur. 2d Arbitration
and Award §§ 82, 145
C.J.S. — 6 C.J.S Arbitration §§ 161 to 163.
AX.R. — Appealability of state court's order
or decree compelling or refusing to compel
arbitration, 6 A.L.R.4th 652.
Uninsured and undennsured motorist coverage: enforceability of policy provision limiting

appeals from arbitration, 23 A.L.R.5th 801.
Appealability of order staying or refusing to
stay, proceedings in federal district court pending arbitration proceedings, 11 A.L.R Fed. 640.
Appealability of federal court order granting
o r denying stay of arbitration, 31 A.L.R. Fed.
234.

78-31a-130. Electronic Signatures in Global a n d National
Commerce Act [Effective May 15, 2003].
The provisions of this chapter governing the legal effect, validity, or
enforceability of electronic records or signatures, and of contracts formed or
performed with the use of such records or signatures conform to the requirements of Section 102 of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National
Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464, and supersede, modify, and
limit the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.
History: C. 1953, 78-31a-130, enacted by
L. 2002, ch. 326, § 30.
Federal Law. — Section 102 of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Com-

merce Act, cited in this section, is 15 U.S.C.S. §
7002.
Effective Dates. — Laws 2002, ch. 326,
§ 34 makes the act effective on May 15, 2003.

78-31a-131. Effect of chapter on p r i o r agreements or proceedings [Effective May 15, 2003].
This act does not affect an action or proceeding commenced or right accrued
before this chapter takes effect. Subject to Section 78-31a-104 of this chapter,
an arbitration agreement made before May 6, 2002 shall be governed by the
arbitration act in force on the date the agreement was signed.
History: C. 1953, 78-31a-131, enacted by
L. 2002, ch. 326, § 31.
Meaning of "this act." — Laws 2002, ch.
326 enacts this chapter to replace the Utah

Arbitration Act effective May 15, 2003.
Effective Dates. — Laws 2002, ch. 326,
§ 34 makes the act effective on May 15, 2003.

